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This thesis investigates public policies and action plans that would help address the 
growing issue of illegal gold mining in the Amazonian Madre de Dios region of Peru. 
Devastating environmental and public health problems affect the region as a direct 
result of illegal mining and the mercury-reliant gold extraction process used by miners 
in the region. This thesis project will employ cost-benefit analysis on potential strategies 
for the Peruvian government or international entities to help curtail the prevalent 
activity of illegal gold mining in the bio-sensitive region of Madre de Dios. The best 
solution(s) will be cost effective, produce high impact, be highly efficient, promote 
fairness, be politically acceptable, robust, and replicable so that other countries can 
learn from and adopt practices from Peru to combat the destructive consequences of 






The thesis is dedicated to my grandmother and grandfather and our many long road 




Above all, I would like to thank Dr. Bencivenga for encouraging me to finish strong and 
holding me to high expectations. From the Plan II Honors Program, I would like to thank 
Dr. Wettlaufer, and my advisors, Katie O’Donnell and Melissa Ossian, who have helped 
me navigate my thesis journey and plan out my course schedule to somehow fit all of 
my academic pursuits into three amazing years at the University of Texas and one 
wonderful year at Oxford University. Through Plan II, I have had the opportunity to 
explore Rome and the Vatican with Prof. Sean Theriault, engage in the world of social 
enterprise and civic engagement with Prof. Lee Walker, and spend a year at Oxford. 
More than anything, Plan II has challenged my ideas and the way I approach the world 
through our many round-table discussions with my classmates facilitated by thought 
leaders from across the university. Lastly, I would also like to thank my parents for 
providing unconditional love and support and my friends who have struggled alongside 
me as we remember our dear friend, Nicky, who passed away tragically last year.   
 5 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
List of Figures ....................................................................................................... 7 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 9 
II. METHODOLOGY: APPROACHING THE PROBLEM ................................ 12 
Chapter 1:  Forming the Approach ............................................................... 12 
III. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: ILLEGAL GOLD MINING ............................. 21 
Chapter 2:  The Visible Problems .................................................................. 21 
Overview: The Peruvian Gold Mining Industry ................................. 21 
Damage Report: Steep Environmental Cost ...................................... 26 
SSM and the Mercury Problem ............................................................. 29 
Labor Conditions and Criminal Activity in Madre de Dios ............ 33 
Chapter 3:  Identifying Root Causes ............................................................ 36 
Causal Factors: Supply Side ................................................................... 36 
Causal Factors: Demand Side ................................................................ 39 
Causal Factors: Institutional Weaknesses ........................................... 40 
Chapter 4:  Setting Objectives ....................................................................... 41 
IV. SOLUTIONS ANALYSIS ............................................................................... 43 
Chapter 5:  Current Solutions ........................................................................ 44 
A. Operación Mercurio: Short-Term Military Operations ............... 54 
B. Operación Mercurio: Medium-Term Formalization Plans ......... 55 
 6 
C. Operación Mercurio: Long-Term Investment in Sustainable 
Economic Opportunities.................................................................... 63 
D. Mercury Supply Chain Controls under the Minamata Convention 
and planetGOLD .................................................................................. 75 
Chapter 6:  Prospective Solutions to Control the Gold Supply Chain  86 
A. Responsible Gold Certification Programs: Examples from the 
Kimberley Process and Fairtrade Intiative .................................... 87 
B. Private Sector Solutions: Blockchain-Enabled Supply Management
 ................................................................................................................. 93 
C. Centralized Gold-Buying Programs: Learning from Chile's ENAMI
 ................................................................................................................. 96 
IV. CLOSING THOUGHTS ............................................................................... 100 
References ......................................................................................................... 103 
Biography .......................................................................................................... 114 
  
 7 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: The management consulting problem-solving approach………………………...13 
Figure 2: The traditional 5-Step problem-solving approach. ……………………………...14 
Figure 3: The Kepner Tregoe Method of problem-solving in a business setting. …………15 
Figure 4: The Lyles Method problem-solving approach. ………………………………….16 
Figure 5: Evaluative and practical criteria for policy analysis……………………………..17 
Figure 6: A highly efficient solution should produce a high impact at a low cost. Scale from 
green to red indicates best to worst solutions, respectively. …………………….18 
Figure 7: Map of Madre de Dios showing the mining corridor, where mining is allowed, 
along with La Pampa and Tambopata National Reserve, where all mining activity 
is banned. …………………………………………………………..……………27 
Figure 8: Satellite images show the extent of deforestation in La Pampa from illegal gold 
mining activity. ………………………………………………………………….28 
Figure 9:  Shows the correlation between gold prices, mercury imports, and mining area 
from 2002 to 2010, revealing a clear positive relationship between the three 
variables. …………………………………………………………………..……38 
Figure 10:  Peruvian National Police detonate explosives as a mining camp to destroy mining 
equipment. ………………………………………………………………………44 
 8 
Figure 11:  During Operación Mercurio (image 3 to 4), deforestation from illegal mining was 
reduced 92% compared to the rate of deforestation during the same time period 
last year (image 1 to 2). …………………………………………………………48 
Figure 12:  Operation Mercury–military incursions evaluation. ……………………………54 
Figure 13:  Operation Mercury–formalization strategy evaluation. …………………………63 
Figure 14:  Annual income ranges in Madre de Dios from Brazil nut harvesting, aquaculture, 
and small-scale gold mining. ………………………………………...…….……66 
Figure 15:  Income from sustainable alternatives to informal gold mining have the potential to 
far surpass the average annual income generated in Madre de Dios with 
appropriate measures taken to achieve competitive prices. ……………………..67 
Figure 16:  Operation Mercury–sustainable investment evaluation. 
………………………...75 
Figure 17: planetGOLD break even analysis. ………………………………………………83 
Figure 18: Mercury supply controls evaluation. 
……………………………..…………...…85 
Figure 19: Gold certification program evaluation. ………………………………………….93 
Figure 20. Evaluation of Fairtrade certification aided by a blockchain-based gold supply 
management platform. …………………………………………………………..96 
Figure 21. Mining development bank with a centralized gold buying program evaluation...99 
 9 






 In 2018, Pope Francis visited Madre de Dios, a province in the southern Amazon of Peru, 
bringing with him a dire warning of “a false god which demands human sacrifices.”1 The pontiff 
was referring to gold and the at-risk communities in Peru and elsewhere in the world that engage 
in destructive practices for economic gains. Artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM, or 
SSM, referring specifically to small-scale mining) in Peru causes detrimental health and 
environmental effects, creating an urgent public problem with no foreseeable solution. The gold 
ore extraction and processing techniques used by small-scale miners in Peru have devastating 
consequences, subjecting miners to toxic mercury exposure and hazardous working conditions 
while also wreaking havoc on the fragile Amazonian ecosystem and native communities that rely 
on it. Women and underage girls are trafficked into bars and brothels, catering to the high 
proportions of men in the mining camps. The gold extracted from Madre de Dios at a high 
human and environmental cost is smuggled out of Peru where it is bought by international 
jewelers, tech companies, and national treasuries, who are either unaware or unbothered by the 
source of the gold. Drug cartels use Amazonian gold to launder cash from drug sales in the U.S. 
Illegal gold mining is a complex and persistent problem involving individuals and large entities 
on every level of the gold supply chain, and it is an issue that desperately needs solutions from 
Peruvian and international policymakers. The Pope’s visit to Madre de Dios brought much-
needed international attention to the issue, but more is left to be done. Peru’s Operación 
Mercurio (Operation Mercury) is currently underway to prevent illegal gold mining in the 
 
1 “Pope’s Meeting with Local Citizens of the Amazon Region: Full Text of Papal Discourse - Vatican News,” 
January 19, 2018, https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2018-01/peru-journey-meeting-with-local-citizens-
full-text-.html. 
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southern Amazonian region, but the plan could benefit from strategic support and more effective 
use of its remaining budget. 
 The goal of this thesis is to apply proven management consultant problem-solving 
methods and policy analysis evaluation criteria to pinpoint the root causes of illegal gold mining 
in Peru and evaluate multi-actor solutions to identify opportunities for positive impact. After 
defining the problem and gathering information, I will evaluate current strategies and prospective 
solutions based off of the following criteria: (1) Cost-Effectiveness, (2) Impact, (3) Overall 
Efficiency, (4) Fairness, (5) Political Acceptability, (6) Robustness, and (7) Replicability. First, I 
will evaluate policies and procedures currently in place in Peru such as Operation Mercury’s 
triple-pronged approach of military action, formalization, and investment in sustainable 
alternative industries in Madre de Dios as well as international mercury controls and the 
projectGOLD education initiatives supported by the Minamata Convention and the international 
community. I will then explore promising opportunities to help alleviate the illegal mining 
problem in Madre de Dios offered by technology-driven strategies for gold supply chain 
management. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and Fairtrade Gold Certification are 
two schemes that could be adapted to serve the gold supply chain. Blockchain is the technology 
behind digital currency that records transactions in an online distributed ledger, and it has many 
potential business applications such as supporting a Fairtrade gold supply chain and ensuring 
end-to-end traceability. Chile supports small- and medium-scale copper miners with a centralized 
ore-processing scheme. All of these systems would create a traceable gold supply that would 
hold businesses and governments accountable for their gold sourcing practices preventing 
criminal networks from using illegally mined gold to launder money. As we will discover, likely 
no one solution can effectively address all of the problems caused by illegal gold mining in 
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Madre de Dios, but an optimal combination of these programs can support each other and create 
lasting change in the region.  
This thesis is exploratory, providing only an overview of the positive and negative 
consequences of the solutions discussed. Additionally, I acknowledge that some of my data 
points, especially those regarding black markets and criminal networks, are estimated from 
secondary sources, leaving considerable room for improving accuracy in estimations because of 
the limited availability of this data or difficultly of access. Through my work, I hope to explore 




II. METHODOLOGY: APPROACHING THE PROBLEM 
This thesis will combine management consulting and public policy problem-solving 
processes to develop and propose a practical and effective solution to combat illegal mining in 
Peru and elsewhere. A management consulting problem-solving approach is an effective way to 
approach business problems, but illegal gold mining is not purely a business problem. 
Effectively addressing the issue requires multilateral collaboration from private and public 
actors. Therefore, I will also incorporate aspects of public policy evaluation to ensure that my 
ultimate recommendation is thorough in addressing the diverse problems posed by illegal gold 
mining. 
Chapter 1. Forming the Approach 
The management consulting industry developed around the premise of helping large 
corporations solve their most pressing problems from declining profitability to developing 
products and entering new markets, so the key to success in the $500 billion global industry2 is 
developing an effective problem-solving approach. The generalist management consultant can be 
staffed on a project in any industry across various capabilities, but their problem-solving 
approach usually takes the same universal structure. One former management consultant, 
Kenneth Albert, structures his approach using the following steps: (1) define the problem, (2) 
gather necessary information, (3) perform analysis and draw conclusions, and finally, (4) present 
recommendations and prospective implementation plans to the client.3 Defining the problem 
involves preliminary discussions with the client to help determine underlying causes of the 
 
2 “Consulting Industry Market Research,” Plunkett Research, Ltd. (blog), accessed February 14, 2020, 
https://www.plunkettresearch.com/industries/consulting-market-research/. 
3 Kenneth J. Albert, How to Solve Business Problems :The Consultant’s Approach to Business Problem Solving /, 
1st McGraw-Hill paperback ed. (New York :, 1983), 22, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.49015001247106. 
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problem, as well as limiting the scope of the project to make it manageable. Within this step, 
Albert also highlights the importance of setting objectives to give the project purpose, stressing 
that “[objectives] not only define what is expected when the study is completed, but they are 
extremely useful in guiding the program during the execution of the study effort.”4 Ultimately, 
Albert contends that his management consulting approach can be applied universally to any 
problem that a business faces, making it a good springboard for our purposes, but we can 
continue to further refine and adapt our approach to the issue at hand. 
Management Consultant Approach (Albert) 
1. Defining the Problem 
2. Gathering Necessary Information 
3. Analyzing and Drawing Conclusions 
4. Making Recommendations and Effecting Implementation 
Figure 1: The management consulting problem-solving approach.5 
Some critics would argue that Albert’s approach lacks structure, but the management 
consulting problem-solving approach is an appropriate starting point for our project because (1) 
it is a proven method based on sound research, and (2) it provides enough flexibility to add 
additional sub-steps where required, in our case public policy considerations.  
 Albert’s approach closely resembles the Lyles Method. The Lyles Method is used for 
problem-solving and decision making in a management environment and was developed by a 
management expert Richard Lyles to combine the simplicity of the Traditional Five-Step 
Approach with the thoroughness of the Kepner Tregoe Method. The Five-Step Approach is 
similar to Albert’s consultant method in that it is simple and straightforward. The goal of this 
 
4 Albert, 24. 
5 Albert, 4–5. 
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approach is to generate multiple solutions and then weigh them against each other to arrive at a 
solution.   
Traditional 5-Step Approach 
1. Define the Problem 
2. Generate Alternatives 
3. Select the Best Alternative(s) 
4. Implement 
5. Monitor the Results 
Figure 2: The traditional 5-Step problem-solving approach.6 
The Kepner Tregoe (K/T) Method is unique in its dichotomy between Problem Analysis 
and Decision Analysis. The K/T Method’s Problem Analysis steps cater more specifically to 
problems arising in the work environment, so the only relevant steps for our purposes are those 
that aid in identifying root causes. The Decision Analysis process is useful for determining how 
to proceed after a problem is identified, although Lyles argues that the K/T method is 
“cumbersome” and is “of little help in developing creative solutions to complex problems.”7 In 
our approach, we want to follow a structured, logical process that allows for flexibility to 




6 Richard I. Lyles, Practical Management Problem Solving and Decision Making (New York: Van Nostrand 
Reinhold, 1982), vi. 
7 Lyles, vii. 
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Kepner Tregoe Method 
A. Problem Analysis 
1. Define an expected standard of Performance 
2. Recognize a deviation from the Standard 
3. Precisely Identify, Locate, and Describe the Deviation 
4. Identify the Distinctions and Changes 
5. Find Relevant Changes that are Producing Unwanted Effects 
6. Deduce Possible Causes from the Relevant Changes 
7. Identify the Cause that Exactly Explains all the Facts in the Specification of the Problem 
B.  Decision Analysis 
1. Establish the Objectives of the Decision 
2. Classify the Objectives as to Importance 
3. Develop Alternative Actions 
4. Evaluate Alternatives Against Established Objectives 
5. Tentatively Choose the Best Alternative 
6. Explore Tentative Decision for Future Possible Adverse Consequences 
7. Control Effects of the Final Decision by Taking Actions to Prevent Possible Adverse Consequences and by 
Making Sure Actions Decided on are Carried Out 
Figure 3: The Kepner Tregoe Method of problem-solving in a business setting.8 
Enter the Lyles Method. Developed by management expert Richard Lyles, the Lyles 
Method is an often-used management problem-solving and decision-making process that 
combines the straightforwardness of the Five-Step Approach with the comprehensiveness of the 
K/T Method. Referring to Figure 4, steps (1) through (7) are used for problem-solving situations, 
while (2) through (7) are primarily used for decision-making. The process is cyclical because 
according to Lyles, oftentimes “decisions create new problems for which new solutions are 
 
8 Lyles, vii. 
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required,”9 hence the need for further analysis and monitoring once an action plan is established. 
The goal of this process is to determine causality and effectively address those root causes. If the 
problem continues to occur, then the root causes have not been sufficiently addressed. 
 
Figure 4: The Lyles Method problem-solving approach.10 
Albert’s management consulting approach is largely based on a combination of these 
three methods, and this approach is flexible enough to adapt to the problem at hand. 
Additionally, approaching the issue from a consultant’s standpoint allows us to view the issue 
from the lens of a neutral third party when recommending certain policy actions, which is a huge 
advantage for legislators and interest groups promoting issues of illegal mining in a politicized 
environment, and it allows us to weigh the actions of different public and private sector groups in 
real terms without bureaucratic red-tape limitations, although we will consider the bureaucratic 
process to an extent. Our consultant can recommend policies to both public and private entities 
instead of being limited to serving one client.  
  
 
9 Lyles, ix. 
10 Lyles, vii. 
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To effectively weigh the solutions of our multi-actor problem, established public policy 
problem-solving approaches should also be included within the analysis to account for 
prospective policies and their efficiency in creating impact. Choosing appropriate criteria is 
crucial to assessing effective action plans. In policy analysis, we should consider both evaluative 
and practical criteria.11 There are many metrics or standards that we could use to examine 
policies at hand, but for these purposes, I have narrowed them down to the following assessment 
categories: 
Evaluative Considerations 
1. Efficiency  
1.1. Cost-Effectiveness 
1.2. Potential Impact  
2. Fairness  
Practical Considerations 
3. Political Acceptability  
4. Robustness 
5. Replicability  
Figure 5: Evaluative and practical criteria for policy analysis. 
 For each prospective solution, I will generate a report card that measures how well the 
solution satisfies each criterion. Where possible, I will quantify the measurement, but most 
categories will be qualitatively assessed on a high-medium-low scale (green-yellow-red, 
respectively). Each assessment category is defined as follows: 
 
11 Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective Problem Solving 
(New York: Chatham House Publishers, Seven Bridges Press, 2000), 20. 
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• Cost: This measurement considers overall cost at a project level as well as a practical 
level, or the ability for different solutions to acquire funding. Considered alongside 
impact, we can measure the overall efficiency of the solution. 
• Impact Potential: This category measures to what extent the proposed solution 
addresses our known root causes under favorable circumstances, where the maximum 
potential impact is achieved. Section III outlines the root causes of illegal gold mining, 
which will form the baseline for effective impact. Prospective solutions should address 
root causes, the underlying causal factors, instead of focusing on surface-level issues. 
• Overall Efficiency: This metric measures how well the prospective solution maximizes 
overall benefit relative to the cost of implementation. Combining the degree of overall 
cost and potential impact of a solution reveals the degree to which it is efficient (See 
Figure 6.). A highly efficient solution will deliver a high impact at a low cost, while a low 
impact and high-cost solution is considered highly inefficient. 
 
High Cost Low Cost 
High Impact Efficient Highly Efficient 
Low Impact Highly Inefficient Inefficient 
Figure 6. A highly efficient solution should produce a high impact at a low cost. Scale from 
green to red indicates best to worst solutions, respectively. 
 
• Fairness: An evaluative metric that is highly subjective, fairness will be used to take into 
account the welfare of the miners on an individual level and their communities by 
considering social justice. Fair solutions will not force miners to give up their livelihoods 
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but rather offer them options and opportunities to improve their practices or transition 
into sustainable economic alternatives.   
• Political Acceptability: To be feasible, a policy must not be politically unacceptable–
have too much opposition and/or too little support.12 To evaluate this metric, we will have 
to consider the political process in Peru and the interactions between national and 
regional governments. The national legislature will support solutions that make them 
seem effective in the eyes of the public and international organizations. Regional mining 
interests will oppose any programs that threaten their livelihoods and economic 
opportunities.  
• Robustness: This metric measures the ability of a policy to be implemented in an 
effective form. Policies often are not enacted as designed due to large administrative 
systems and distortion by bureaucratic interests, so an effective policy should anticipate 
and prevent adverse implementation outcomes like the capture of program benefits to an 
unintended constituency or misuse of program resources.13 
• Replicability: This metric considers the ability for a policy or solution to be effectively 
replicated by a different entity facing the same problem(s). Replicability is desirable in an 
effective solution, so other countries facing the same problems can look to Peru and other 
involved actors as models of success. 
Assembled into a report card, these metrics will be able to identify opportunities to improve 
program effectiveness in reducing illegal gold mining activity and its harmful practices in Peru 
and elsewhere. The hope is that this report will be able to shed light on some of the complexities 
surrounding this issue and the challenges that the international community faces with regard to 
 
12 Bardach, 24. 
13 Bardach, 25. 
 21 
setting out a plan of action. As with any opportunity to enact new policies, the ultimate limitation 
in problem-solving and policymaking is the process. This thesis essentially applies a static, 
systematic process to a dynamic, ever-evolving situation like illegal gold mining in Peru. The 
end goal is to identify causal level events, circumstances, or phenomena that create the 
conditions for illegal gold mining to occur in the first place and to develop solutions that could 
potentially prevent this activity.  
 As a result of exploring commonly used management consulting problem-solving 
methods and public policy criteria, I will utilize the following plan: 
1. Define the problem. 
2. Identify root causes and set objectives. 
3. Perform analysis of current and prospective solutions using policy evaluation criteria that 
align with our stated objectives. 




III. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: ILLEGAL GOLD MINING 
The first step in our approach is to define the problem by highlighting surface-level 
problems. We will then attempt to identify their root causes. The objectives we set will take these 
revelations into consideration while determining the course of our solutions analysis. 
Chapter 2. The Visible Problems 
OVERVIEW: THE PERUVIAN GOLD MINING INDUSTRY 
 Peru has one of the fastest-growing economies in Latin America with an average real 
GDP growth rate of 6.1% over the last decade.14  Rich in natural resources, Peruvian economic 
development has long relied on extractive industries that exploit the country’s metals and 
minerals. Gold and silver mining have existed for thousands of years in the region, even before 
the Incas. The Spaniards systematically exploited native labor to reach the valuable metals lying 
beneath the Andes and in turn, became an imperialist world power. Jump to 2017, and Peru 
produced 155 tons of gold, making it the largest gold producer in Latin America and the sixth-
largest producer globally.15 In 2018, gold production comprised ~16% ($7.13 billion)16 of Peru’s 
net exports, making it considerably more important to the Peruvian economy as a whole when 
compared to neighboring countries like Mexico, another large gold producer in Latin America 
whose $5.1 billion in gold exports only account for 1.2% of its net exports.17 The Peruvian 
economy heavily relies on gold production. 
 
14 “Peru,” World Bank, accessed April 2, 2020, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/peru. 
15 “Mineral Commodity Summary 2018,” accessed April 23, 2018, 
https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/gold/mcs-2018-gold.pdf. 
16 “OEC - Peru (PER) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners,” accessed May 15, 2020, 
https://oec.world/en/profile/country/per/. 
17 “OEC - Mexico (MEX) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners,” accessed May 20, 2020, 
https://oec.world/en/profile/country/mex/. 
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 Gold mining operations in Peru are classified by the following legal parameters: artisanal 
mines are those that hold mining concessions of less than 1,000 hectares with a production 
capacity of less than 25 metric tons per day (TMD); small-scale mines comprise up to 2,000 
hectares and have a capacity of up to 350 TMD; medium-sized mines have a capacity of 350-
5,000 TMD; large-scale mines have a capacity of over 5,000 TMD.18  Medium- and large-scale 
mining operations are typically formalized entities; however, much of the small-scale mining 
activity operates outside of the formal economy and is considered either informal or illegal 
economic activity. The Peruvian government makes a legal distinction between informal and 
illegal mining. Informal miners operate on mining concessions with or without permission from 
concession holders or in any area where mining is allowed using authorized equipment. Miners 
are considered illegal when they operate in areas where gold mining is banned such as native 
lands and the buffer zones of protected reserves in Madre de Dios or use prohibited machinery 
and mining equipment such as dragas, or dredges. Dredges are illegal because of the significant 
environmental damage that they cause, although miners still use them because of their high 
processing capacity of around 1000 TMD per day.19 In 2012, the government established a 
formalization process for small-scale miners, requiring: “a title to the concession or an agreement 
with the concession owner, authorization to work the land, an approved environmental impact 
study, water rights, a certificate of the non-existence of archaeological artifacts, authorization to 
carry out exploration and/or processing activities, and accreditation as a small-scale or artisanal 
miner, among other things.”20 Any miner that did not officially declare an intent to formalize was 
 
18 “Indicators of Forced Labor in Gold Mining in Peru,” accessed April 22, 2018, http://www.verite.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/Indicators-of-Forced-Labor-in-Gold-Mining-in-Peru_0.pdf. 
19 José Álvarez et al., “INFORME PREPARADO POR EL INSTITUTO DE LA AMA ZONÍA PERUANA - IIAP 
Y EL MINISTERIO DEL AMBIENTE,” n.d., 54. 
20 “Indicators of Forced Labor in Gold Mining in Peru.” 
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categorized as illegal, so many small-scale miners that were previously classified as informal 
became illegal under the new decree, leaving the legal status of many mining operations in 
limbo. It is estimated that illegal and informal mining comprises ~20% of Peru’s total gold 
production21 and directly employs over 500,000 Peruvians with 40,000 in Madre de Dios alone.22 
In 2011, Peru’s illegal mining exports were estimated to generate $1.79 billion in revenue or 
22% of Peru’s total gold exports that year.23 
 In the past, the taxes collected from large, formalized mines have contributed to almost 
one quarter of internal tax revenues for the Peruvian government and are distributed to municipal 
governments in mining regions to be used for infrastructure projects.24 In this manner, large-
scale mines create opportunities for economic development in rural regions of Peru while also 
providing direct employment that pays laborers almost double of what they would earn working 
in other industries in Peru.25 Despite these advantages, Peru has not been able to fully unlock the 
potential benefits from formal mining activity. The government is unable to raise and collect 
taxes effectively. While some revenue is gained, a significant amount of potential revenue is lost. 
In 2011, then-presidential candidate Ollanta Humala vowed to raise taxes on formal mines to 
fund rural development projects. Taxes across the industry were raised by $1 billion, but the 
 
21 David J.X. Gonzalez, “Opportunities, Not Oppression, to Stop Illegal Mining in the Peruvian Amazon | 
YaleGlobal Online,” February 18, 2016, https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/opportunities-not-oppression-stop-
illegal-mining-peruvian-amazon. 
22 “Peru Fights Gold Fever with Fire and Military Force - The Washington Post,” accessed April 9, 2020, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/peru-fights-gold-fever-with-fire-and-military-force/2014/08/18/2c9db976-
bfd5-4217-a846-31bde9871e21_story.html. 
23 Elyssa Pachico, “‘Illegal Mining Bigger than Drug Trade in Peru’: Analyst,” InSight Crime (blog), May 17, 2012, 
https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/illegal-mining-bigger-than-drug-trade-in-peru-analyst/. 
24 Jane Korinek, “Managing the Minerals Sector: Implications for Trade from Peru and Colombia,” no. 186 
(December 2, 2015): 11, https://doi.org/10.1787/5jrp6wrc2r7l-en. 
25 Korinek, 14. 
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government failed to collect approximately $877 million.26 The lost tax revenue could be 
invested into development projects, bringing additional prosperity to mining regions. It could 
also be used to help rural communities near mining operations mitigate the negative 
environmental impacts of mining such as contaminated water sources, redirection of water 
sources, lead poisoning, and take-over of agricultural land. While large mining operations are 
subject to strict environmental and worker safety regulations from the Ministry of the 
Environment (MINAM) and the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MINEM), environmental 
contamination still, creating tensions between mining corporations and local communities where 
local livelihoods have been affected. Additionally, the distribution of the municipal tax dollars 
from mining is largely ineffective because of corruption and lack of government accountability. 
In Peru, government institutions are largely concentrated in the capital, Lima, where almost one 
half of the entire Peruvian population lives. This means that regional and municipal government 
officials in rural mining regions lack accountability. Nine out of 25 regional governors were 
accused of corruption in 2014 alone.27 Also, the fragmented distribution of funding prevents 
large government-sponsored infrastructure projects from taking shape in mining regions. While 
many imperfections exist the government’s ability to collect taxes and use them for the benefit of 
mining communities, informal mining remains an important source of potential tax revenue for 
rural areas that has not yet been tapped into. Small-scale gold mining could provide an estimated 
$305 million in taxes per year across Peru28 and between S/50 and 200 million ($14.6-58 
 
26 Alina Buccella, “Can the Minamata Convention on Mercury Solve Peru’s Illegal Artisanal Gold Mining 
Problem?,” Yearbook of International Environmental Law; Oxford 24, no. 1 (2013): 182, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/yiel/yvu063. 
27 Korinek, “Managing the Minerals Sector,” 32. 
28 Elie Gardner, “Peru Battles the Golden Curse of Madre de Dios,” Nature News 486, no. 7403 (June 21, 2012): 
306, https://doi.org/10.1038/486306a. 
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million) in Madre de Dios alone.29 Finding ways to mitigate the negative effects of small-scale 
mining with the positive benefits from tax revenue is an important challenge that policymakers 
face in managing the small-scale gold mining sector in Peru.  
 While various governmental agencies regulate large-scale mining operations, their 
regulatory capacities have failed to address small-scale mining, which has become a burgeoning 
public health and environmental disaster across Peru. This problem has worsened since the 
booming gold prices in 2005, but the spotlight has only recently intensified on illegal and 
informal Peruvian mining practices because of increased concerns about the environmental 
destruction in the sensitive southern Amazon region. The Amazon jungle is nicknamed the 
“lungs of the earth” because of the vast amounts of carbon dioxide it is able to convert into 
breathable oxygen. Madre de Dios is a concentrated hub of biodiversity, so environmentalists 
fear the destructive nature of illegal mining and its inevitable effects on the natural environment. 
In 2010, 370,000 acres of forest had already been cut down by illegal and informal mining 
activity.30 But some argue that international organizations are only concerned with the 
environmental damage and ignore the human costs of illegal gold mining. This thesis will 
explore the full extent of the damage that illegal gold mining activity causes in the following 
section.  
 The Madre de Dios region will be the particular focus of this paper. It is located in the 
southeastern Amazonian region of Peru. The capital is a town called Puerto Maldonado that 
serves as a hub for illegal gold mining activities. It is worth noting that illegal and informal 
mining is prevalent in most areas of Peru such as Piura (on the northern coast) and La Rinconada 
 
29 Álvarez et al., “INFORME PREPARADO POR EL INSTITUTO DE LA AMA ZONÍA PERUANA - IIAP Y EL 
MINISTERIO DEL AMBIENTE.” 
30 “Gold Mining Fact Sheet,” accessed May 2, 2018, 
http://www.amazonconservation.org/pdf/gold_mining_fact_sheet.pdf. 
 27 
(in the southern Andes), showing that illegal mining is a deep-rooted issue across the country. La 
Rinconada is the highest populated settlement in the world, and miners dig through glaciers and 
rock to reach the valuable gold ore beneath. In La Rinconada alone, over 60,000 Peruvians are 
employed in the mines, risking their lives every day for the opportunity to discover gold.31 But 
miners in La Rinconada do not get as much attention because they do not threaten the Amazon. 
Over 500,000 Peruvians engage in small-scale mining activities across the country and this 
number increases every year as men and women flock to gold producing regions seeking new 
economic opportunities.32 It is the use of harmful and exploitative mining practices that poses 
huge risks to miners, indigenous communities, and the environment. 
DAMAGE REPORT: ENVIRONMENTAL COST 
Amazonian ecosystems are fragile and, therefore, can only support small-scale gold 
mining on a limited and regulated scale. The surging price of gold combined with the 
construction of the Interoceanic Highway from the Peruvian Pacific coast to Brazil created a gold 
rush. Miners flocked to Madre de Dios and invaded protected lands or empty concessions for 
gold mining. In Madre de Dios, mining is allowed in a strip of land called the “mining corridor.” 
Any mining activity here is considered informal and not illegal when miners declare their intent 
to formalize and use only authorized equipment. Miners can expect to extract 12-18g of gold per 
day in the mining corridor.33 Right across the Interoceanic Highway is La Pampa, a hub of illegal 
mining consisting of a 20km strip of land along the highway in the buffer zone of the National 
Reserve of Tambopata. Alluvial gold is much more concentrated in illegal areas like La Pampa 
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and Tambopata than in the designated mining corridor. In La Pampa, miners are able to extract 
60-80g of gold per day, and in the Tambopata Reserve itself, as much as 150-200g of gold can be 
extracted per day.34 In protected areas and buffer zones, all forms of mining activity are illegal, 
but the lure of more gold and profits attracts more miners.  
 
Figure 7. Map of Madre de Dios showing the mining corridor, where mining is allowed, and La 
Pampa with Tambopata National Reserve, where all mining activity is banned.35 
Deforestation is a major environmental issue in Madre de Dios, since miners clear cut 
forests to access the alluvial gold held in the topsoil underneath. MAAP, a satellite mapping 
project, has uncovered the true extent of the damage caused by illegal gold mining over time. 
Between 1985, when the project begun, and 2017, 95,750 hectares (~240,000 acres) of land was 
deforested in the southeastern region of Peru.36 The same study reported that more than two-
thirds of that deforestation occurred between 2006 and 2017, an area equivalent to 90,456 soccer 
fields. Figure 8 shows the extent of the spread of deforestation in La Pampa from illegal gold 
mining activity in recent years. 
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Figure 8. Satellite images show the extent of deforestation in La Pampa from illegal gold 
mining activity.37 
The Interoceanic Highway that was constructed to give Brazil access to Chinese markets (but 
that some allege was built for political favors38…), was constructed through Madre de Dios from 
2006 to 2011. The highway runs along the border between the mining corridor and the La 
Pampa/Tambopata area, giving ASGM operations easy access to the acres. Deforestation from 
illegal mining increased by 425% in the region during the construction of the road from 2,010 
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hectares/year to 8,536 hectares/year; deforestation peaked in 2017 with 9,860 hectares of 
Amazon deforested.39  
Some argue that focusing on the deforestation from ASGM in Madre de Dios is an elitist 
perspective that ignores the importance of small-scale gold mining for wealth distribution to the 
region (because trees can be replanted and denying Peruvians the right to extract their gold is 
unfair), and that the environmental safeguards that are required for formalization are 
burdensome; however, mercury used in gold ore processing by small-scale miners causes severe 
human health complications as well as additional negative environmental consequences that need 
urgent attention. 
ASGM AND THE MERCURY PROBLEM 
While typical mining processes vary according to regional conditions, in Madre de Dios 
gold extraction practices are particularly harsh on the miners as well as the environment. 
Amazonian miners use a rudimentary mercury amalgamation process called whole ore 
amalgamation (WOA) to extract and refine gold ore. Wide tracts of forested land near riverbanks 
are slashed and burned, and gold-containing mud is extracted leaving behind open pits. This mud 
is then pumped through sluices layered with a thick carpet that traps heavy sediment in the 
crevices–gold is heavier than the silt and gets trapped. Miners then gather the sediment in large 
barrels into which they also dump mercury. Mercury binds to the gold particles with the help of 
miners who partially immerse themselves in these mercury-filled barrels (or enlist child workers) 
to stomp around in the mixture, creating a gold-mercury amalgam. This amalgam is poured into 
a bowl where the mercury is then burned off, leaving behind 99.9% pure gold. The burning-off 
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process often takes place inside miners’ huts, adjacent to where they cook their own meals, 
meaning that miners often directly inhale toxic mercury fumes.40  
Part of what makes small-scale mining so detrimental to public and environmental health 
is the vast amount of mercury dumped into the Amazon ecosystem. Peru stopped importing 
mercury in 2015 and banned the use of domestically produced mercury for mining, yet mercury 
is still readily accessible to miners through black markets.41 In 2016, President Ollanta Humala 
was forced to declare a 60-day state of emergency in Madre de Dios due to extremely high levels 
of mercury contamination from mining activities.42 An estimated 44 to 50 tonnes of mercury are 
used for small-scale mining in Madre de Dios per year, almost all of which is released into the 
environment.43 For reference, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency advises to contact a 
hazardous waste specialist if any mercury spill larger than that produced by a broken 
thermometer, which contains ~0.7g of mercury, occurs.44 
 People living in or near SSM operations are often exposed to mercury from vapors 
produced by burning the amalgam or from consuming fish or drinking water contaminated with 
methylmercury (what mercury turns into after release into the environment). As an element, 
mercury does not break down but accumulates in riverbanks, plants, fish, and, farther up the food 
chain, in people. Nine out of every 15 fish sold in Puerto Maldonado’s marketplace were found 
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to contain high levels of mercury.45 Hair follicle tests to measure mercury concentration have 
also been conducted on native communities that mostly rely on local fish as their primary source 
of protein, and the results showed concerning levels of mercury in local members. 78% of adults 
in Puerto Maldonado had hair concentrations of mercury that were higher than the international 
reference limit, and women of childbearing age had the highest overall average concentration.46 
This is particularly concerning because mercury can have serious effects on developing fetuses, 
causing severe neurological damage when transferred to the fetus through the placenta. 
 The devastating health effects of mercury are well documented. Miners are often engaged 
in this industry for years, often starting as teenagers. Both forms of mercury, elemental (which is 
used in the mining processes) and methylmercury are toxic to the central and peripheral nervous 
systems. In SSM communities in Burkina Faso, the World Health Organization reports common 
symptoms of individuals involved in mercury-gold amalgamation or gold dealing and selling 
included frequent headaches, sleep disorders, unusual tiredness, trembling and vision disorders.47 
Inhaled mercury vapors are rapidly absorbed into the bloodstream and negatively affect the 
nervous, digestive, and immune systems, lungs, and kidneys. Neurological disorders such as 
mental retardation, seizures, vision and hearing loss, delayed mental or physical development, 
language disorders, and memory loss are commonly reported long-term side effects of mercury 
exposure.48  
 If the health risks of mercury exposure are so serious, why do small-scale miners 
continue to use it? For many miners, mercury is quick and easy to use for the purpose of 
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isolating gold particles in an amalgam. Mercury is also cheaper to use than most alternative 
techniques, such as gravimetric ore processing technology, which requires significant investment 
and does not process as much ore. Only one person is needed to process the amalgam, so 
independent miners can easily use this technique, especially because a single miner can process 
small batches of ore at a time which helps manageability of this process. Many miners are 
unaware of the risks associated with mercury exposure and simply follow their boss’s 
instructions; other miners are aware of the health risks but are unable to afford more expensive 
alternative methods.49 Some miners don’t believe the warnings and were reportedly willing to 
drink mercury to prove its safety.50  
 The effects of mercury use in SSM are not limited to mining localities. Mercury cycles 
globally. Mercury that is burned from amalgam is highly mobile in the environment, eventually 
depositing in soil and sediments where bacteria and microbes convert elemental mercury into 
methylmercury that concentrates at high levels of the food chain because of biomagnification. 
This can contaminate seafood that people eat as well as agricultural products because 95% of 
ingested methylmercury is absorbed by the body. In 2010, global emissions of mercury from 
anthropogenic sources were estimated at 1,400 tonnes with artisanal and small-scale mining 
being the largest anthropogenic contributor to this atmospheric mercury, comprising 37% of total 
atmospheric mercury output.51 Mercury from SSM accounts for much of the mercury released 
into aquatic environments. In addition to that, deforestation from clearing land for mining 
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releases mercury held in soils.52 The mercury disposal from SSM puts Amazonian communities, 
particularly miners and indigenous groups that rely on river ecosystems for water and fish, at 
serious risk. 
LABOR CONDITIONS AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IN MADRE DE DIOS 
Soaring prices of gold have managed to attract young men to Madre de Dios with the 
promise of profitable earnings. Some were convinced by their own family members to join the 
gold rush; however, upon arrival, many were forced into hazardous labor conditions and 
practices, sometimes through debt bondage and other times at gunpoint.  
The remoteness of the mining camps leaves miners vulnerable to exploitation by 
concession owners or wealthy, more established miners. Multiple reports have found evidence of 
forced labor and child labor in the gold mining in Madre de Dios. Some workers are exploited 
through debt bondages. Established miners provide deceptive loans to newcomers. These new 
workers are then forced to pay back the loans through free or reduced-pay labor. Rich miners and 
concession owners easily exploit smaller, self-employed miners because some level of 
formalization is required to sell mined gold. Other shady or coercive middlemen buy illegal gold 
at low prices and sell it off at higher prices to international buyers, serving as a market access 
point to miners in the most remote regions of the country.  
But miners have other eager buyers willing to buy their gold: criminal organizations. The 
disparity between middlemen prices and international gold market prices incentivizes small 
miners to sell their gold to criminal networks who are willing to pay higher prices for illegally 
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mined gold. Illegal gold can be used by these criminal groups to launder drug profits and for ease 
of transporting funds. One regular-sized brick of gold is equivalent to over $500,000. 
Illegal and informal miners do not operate in accordance with any kind of occupational 
safety measures. This makes mercury exposure inevitable. Other health and safety risks include 
exposure to sunlight for prolonged periods of time which causes skin damage, dehydration, and 
severe sunburns that increase the risk for cancer. Accidents are also common because of the 
rudimentary technology often employed. Workers have no form of social security or medical 
coverage, and miners interviewed by Verité, a labor rights watchdog group, reported that fatal 
accidents were common. Miners killed on the job were often buried in unmarked graves and no 
information was provided to their families.53 The remote and isolated locations of many of the 
mining camps make it impossible for authorities to closely monitor labor conditions and enforce 
occupational safety standards. 
 Sexual exploitation is also a serious issue in Madre de Dios. The region has a high 
proportion of young men, and ramshackle bars and gentlemen’s clubs line the roads near mining 
communities. Many of the women working are underage or come from abroad without 
documentation. They are recruited to move to Madre de Dios to work as cooks or in other 
supporting jobs but, upon arrival, are forced into prostitution. Moving people throughout the 
region is easy because rivers are used daily by thousands of people and are sparsely policed. In 
October 2011, the police in Madre de Dios managed to rescue 293 female trafficking victims, 
seven of whom were minors.54  
 In addition to deceptive labor recruitment tactics and sex trafficking, child labor is also a 
major issue when it comes to illegal gold mining, especially because of mercury exposure. 
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Children commonly work alongside their own family members or even independently. Estimates 
of how many children work in the illegal and informal mines of Madre de Dios are conflicting, 
but because of the extremely dangerous conditions and labor tasks assigned to children such as 
using mercury to process amalgam and carrying heavy loads, children working in mining are at 
high risk of serious injury and reduced health and mental development, leading the International 
Labor Organization to categorize child labor in mining as a Worst Form of Child Labor.55  
 Extensive criminal networks support the burgeoning illegal gold mining industry in 
Madre de Dios. As previously mentioned, criminal organizations buy illegally mined gold at 
high prices because gold holds its value and is a useful alternative to banking systems for hiding 
and storing profits from drugs and weapons trafficking. Additionally, vast smuggling networks 
exist to provide miners with capital goods and regulated resources like gasoline. The deeply 
intertwined relationship between criminal groups and gold miners makes formalization, a process 
which requires cooperation with government entities, unlikely and policing efforts dangerous. A 
“no rules apply” type of system has developed on protected lands like La Pampa and Tambopata 
National Reserve. This is because miners who operate in protected territories are openly 
engaging in illegal mining activities that are more likely to be tied to criminal networks. They are 
more likely to counter police raids with their own weapons.  
 The issue of illegal gold mining in the Amazon region in Peru requires urgent attention to 
reduce the environmental burden and human health and safety risks posed by dangerous working 
conditions and criminal threats. 
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Chapter 3. Identifying Root Causes 
 The economy of Madre de Dios is closely tied to gold mining–legal, illegal, and 
informal–with it representing 41% of the region’s total GDP. 56 Including industries related to 
gold mining like fuel and transportation, 70% of Madre de Dios’ GDP, or 7 out of every 10 soles 
(the Peruvian currency), is thought to be influenced by gold extraction. The gold production from 
Madre de Dios is also important for the national economy; a recent news article reported that 
Madre de Dios produces 11% of Peruvian gold exports even though one-third (~412,000 oz) of 
this gold is illegally mined.57  
 My first step is to break down the gold market of Madre de Dios into supply and demand 
factors to examine the workings of its regional gold economy at a more detailed level. 
Institutional weaknesses also contribute to the proliferation of illegal gold mining, but these 
issues require long-term structural changes that are out of scope of this project. For now, 
corruption and lack of government authority at the levels that they currently exist are additional 
factors to consider in our analysis. 
CAUSAL FACTORS: SUPPLY SIDE 
On the supply side, one factor that contributes to the proliferation of small-scale gold 
mining is poverty. The lack of alternative economic opportunities elsewhere in Peru and in the 
region means that prospective miners are left with few options to sustain themselves. Lack of 
education also limits the miners’ alternatives and means that many miners are either unaware of 
the risks of mercury use or simply do not know to take the warnings seriously. One report found 
that 70.6% of Peruvians living in extreme poverty live in the Sierra, or highland regions of Peru, 
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where most miners report being from.58 While national poverty rates increased nationally from 
2016 to 2017, poverty rates in Madre de Dios decreased 3% overall within the same time 
period.59 Additionally in 2016, 51.9% of people above the age of 15 and living below the poverty 
line reported either some primary school completion or no education level attained at all.60 
Miners can earn lucrative salaries through illegal mining as compared to agriculture or fishing, 
and it does not require an education, only familiarity with the extraction and refinement 
processes, which are learned on the job. One report estimated that miners can earn between $100 
and $200 in a 24-hour shift, or the equivalent of the average of one month’s wages in Madre de 
Dios.61 For comparison, a farm laborer earns between $10-15 per day. The difference is enough 
to lure men, especially uneducated men from the poorest highland regions, to Madre de Dios.  
With few economic opportunities and without education, many people seek gold mining 
in Madre de Dios as an opportunity to earn a decent wage. This is supported by the positive 
relationship between gold prices and level of small-scale gold mining in Madre de Dios. When 
the price of gold spiked in 2008, as investors in developed countries sought value-preserving 
investments in gold amidst the economic crash, mining activity increased in Madre de Dios (See 
Figure 9 below.), demonstrating that higher gold prices are associated with more illegal mining 
activity in the region. The lure of gold and prosperity incentivizes young men to move to the 
Amazon with the promise of sizeable profits offsetting the inherent risks associated with illegal 
gold mining. 
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Figure 9. Shows the correlation between gold prices, mercury imports, and mining area from 
2002 to 2010, revealing a clear positive relationship between the three variables.62 
 
Lastly, the lack of access to financing for miners means that they face few options for the 
technology that they use to extract and process gold ore. Mercury is cheap, does not require 
expertise to use, and is readily available. Gravimetric processors that use gravity to sort heavier 
gold particles from lighter silt can actually recover a higher amount of gold from ore, but the 
equipment is expensive (~$5,000-10,000 per machine63) and cannot process the same volume of 
ore as illegal technology such as dredges that can process 1000 tonnes of ore per day.64 Miners 
try to process as much ore per day as possible to extract the most amount of gold. Allowing 
miners to use only equipment that is more expensive and less profitable is not a practical solution 
without providing financial support and technical assistance to encourage miners to use more 
responsible practices. 
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CAUSAL FACTORS: DEMAND SIDE 
 On the demand side, gold is a global commodity used by central banks, governments, and 
investors as a safe, value-preserving investment. Times of high risk and uncertainty cause capital 
flight from stock markets to gold bullion, and as previously mentioned, the increased price for 
gold creates greater profit potential for miners. As the Peruvian government made it more 
difficult for informal and illegal miners to sell their gold through formal markets by banning the 
purchase and sale of illegally mined gold, criminal organizations have realized its money 
laundering potential. Miners have been able to sell to criminal organizations who pay more than 
smaller middlemen and who use the gold to launder billions of dollars’ worth of trafficked drugs 
and weapons sales. This is a huge problem and cause for concern that is not limited to Peru. It 
has recently been reported that terrorist organizations such as ISIS have been using similar 
tactics with illegal gold miners in Africa to finance their insurgencies.  
 Here is how money laundering using illegal gold works. Drug cartels with excess cash on 
hand from selling trafficked goods in the U.S. set up shell gold-buying companies in Peru. They 
pay for the illegally mined gold with cash, and then they in turn sell the gold to international 
refineries, who do not ask questions about where the gold is sourced from. In exchange for the 
gold, the shell company receives a wire transfer to a bank account, thus the money becomes 
“clean.” Recently, three gold buyers in Miami were arrested for a $3.6 billion gold laundering 
scheme.65 Their company, NTR Metals, was U.S. gold refiner based in Miami and a gold 
supplier for companies like Apple and Tiffany & Co. 
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CAUSAL FACTORS: INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES 
 Institutional weaknesses in rural areas of Peru also encourages illegal mining activity. 
Corruption and lack of trust in government officials lead some miners to prefer to work 
informally or illegally, outside of traditional authority. Regional environmental features like 
rivers and dense vegetation make small-scale mining regulation enforcement in the region 
difficult. Locals report miners returning to their camps only a few days after police raids. 
Difficulties with enforcement also allow black markets to thrive, providing miners with easy 
access to mercury and illegal mining equipment. The sheer number of small-scale miners makes 
them a powerful political force in an institutionally weak area, with some arguing that the 
construction of the Interoceanic Highway was a ploy for Peruvian politicians to curry favor with 
small-scale miners in the region. The highway gives miners prime access to deep jungle regions 
that were previously inaccessible. Unfortunately, the intrinsic nature of institutional weakness 
makes it a problem that is difficult to root out because of challenges posed by corruption; 
therefore, our proposed solutions will not seek to address this problem directly. To do so would 
require sweeping institutional reforms that are unlikely to transpire in the near future. We are 
therefore forced to work with the political and legislative system in place, and an effective 
solution will incorporate measures to reduce the possibility of corruption and inefficient 
bureaucratic processes as much as possible. 
 Supply and demand market factors, as well as institutional weaknesses, create an 
environment that encourages the proliferation of illegal gold mining in off-limits areas of Madre 
de Dios. Effective solutions must be all-encompassing and will address these underlying factors, 
not only the surface-level consequences described in Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 4. Objectives 
 After a thorough evaluation of surface-level problems and root causes allowing for the 
proliferation of illegal mining activity, it is important to consider what we ultimately would like 
to accomplish when thinking about possible solutions. Setting objectives is an important sub-step 
within problem defining because our objectives direct the course of the project.66 In some sense 
we’ve already done this step by outlining our policy analysis criteria, but it is worth explicitly 
stating our ultimate objectives because some are obvious while others are not. Our policy 
evaluation criteria shed some light on our ultimate goals for a solution: efficiency, fairness, and 
practical considerations like political acceptability, robustness, and replicability. An ideal 
solution would fully satisfy all of these criteria, but it is important to ask why. Efficiency and 
practical considerations are obvious–a solution should solve the given problem effectively–but 
fairness is a highly subjective metric. Throughout my research, I’ve noticed a glaring pattern: 
international organizations and publications emphasize the negative environmental impacts and 
are quick to villainize the miners operating in Madre de Dios. The reality is that mining in all 
forms–small-scale, artisanal, large-scale–has occurred in Peru since ancient times, and there is 
still a lot of gold left. Gold mining will occur in some form for as long as both supply and 
demand for exist. As a country, Peru is rich in natural resources, and its gold could be a huge 
source of economic wealth for Peruvians if properly mined and managed. Illegal mining alone is 
said to produce between $1.7 and 3 billion annually across Peru, twice as much as the country’s 
drug trade which brings in an estimated $1.2 billion,67 so eliminating mining activity altogether 
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would place an undue burden on Peruvians. Additionally, gold mining can spread wealth to rural 
regions with miners receiving around 70% of the international price of gold for their production, 
helping to address issues of rural poverty and regional inequality that many countries suffer 
from.68 So, if gold mining should not be eliminated completely, those that do engage in mining 
activities must do so in a sustainable way to mitigate the negative impacts of current practices. 
Thus, a “fair” solution does not completely outlaw or prevent gold mining, but it does encourage 
people who choose to mine to do so responsibly, adhering to recommended labor, technology, 
and environmental standards and staying away from protected, biologically sensitive areas. The 
burden imposed by measures necessary to achieve this goal should not be placed solely on the 
miners and instead should be shared by government and international organizations who can help 
alleviate the problem. I would judge this distribution of burden to be fair, especially given the 
direct and indirect roles in the proliferation of illegal gold mining that each actor contributes. 
Obviously, there will be some who disagree with this notion and claim that gold mining in the 
Amazon region should be halted altogether, but I would challenge this view because it ignores 
the human aspect of the issue, namely that considerations about miners and community members 
need to be taken into account. My definition of fairness will give human-centered concerns 
precedent over environmental ones; however, both are important. 
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IV. SOLUTIONS ANALYSIS 
Now that we have defined our problem and set objectives, the next step is to analyze current 
mechanisms through which the government aims to address illegal gold mining and evaluate 
potential solutions using the metrics that we established. Note: many observations, cost figures, 
plan details are sourced from second-hand sources such as newspapers and blog posts from 
people on the ground. 
Chapter 5:  Current Solutions 
Operación Mercurio 2019 (Operation Mercury) is the most recent attempt of the 
Peruvian government to combat illegal mining after previous missions failed to effectively 
address the issue. While previous efforts mainly focused on destroying mining encampments and 
equipment, Operation Mercury 2019 has four many objectives:69 
1. Evicting illegal mining operations. 
2. Formalizing SSM in limited areas with responsible environmental and labor 
standards. 
3. Addressing human trafficking and child labor. 
4. Investing in the development of sustainable alternative occupations.  
To achieve these objectives, Operation Mercury utilizes a three-pronged approach that includes 
short-term military action to establish authority in the region followed up with medium-term 
funding to advance formalization initiatives and long-term investment in sustainable 
development. Parts A through C will analyze each “prong” separately based on the criteria 
established in Section II. Additionally, Part D evaluates Peru’s approach to thwarting illegal gold 
 
69 “Operación Mercurio 2019 | Public Policy Peru,” accessed May 9, 2020, 
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mining by implementing controls on the domestic mercury supply as a participant in the 
Minamata Convention. A summary report card will identify areas where each strategy could 
benefit from further support or complementary solutions.  
A.  OPERATION MERCURY–SHORT-TERM IMPACT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN MADRE DE 
DIOS 
 
Figure 10: Peruvian National Police detonate explosives as a mining camp to destroy mining 
equipment.70 
Background 
This section evaluates the impact of the military campaigns that Peruvian presidents have 
used to confront illegal mining head on. Prior to Operation Mercury, the Peruvian government 
would periodically send military raids to Madre de Dios to disperse illegal miners and destroy 
their camps, but overall, these smaller raids achieved little. Illegal miners were still active in the 
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area, and deforestation continued at alarming rates. After years of mounting pressure from 
international organizations and frustration with the lack of formalization in the region (See 
Solution B.), the Peruvian government launched a larger “no-mercy” military campaign in 2014 
with the aim of completely driving out the estimated 40,000 miners from Madre de Dios.  
The 2014 military campaign confronted illegal miners in La Pampa, a corridor of 
concentrated illegal mining activity in Madre de Dios, and received public support in Lima and 
from international environmental activists, while angering the miners whose livelihoods were 
affected. The four-month-long operation did manage to stamp out illegal mining for a time–the 
country’s gold output dropped 14% that year because of the decreased gold output from Madre 
de Dios71–but the effects were only short term. An anonymous military commander spoke to the 
Washington Post about the raids, reporting that even though they had hit an estimated half of the 
illegal mining sites in La Pampa, helicopter flyovers a few days after revealed “the camps rebuilt 
and the dredgers running again.”72 Allegedly, miners were tipped off about the raids beforehand, 
which allowed them to flee and to leave behind less valuable equipment to be destroyed or 
confiscated by the military, while taking their valuable machinery with them. Overall, only four 
illegal miners were prosecuted and sent to prison by authorities as a result of the 2014 raids.  
The ongoing military engagements in Madre de Dios had little to show for, only serving 
to ingrain the miners’ anti-government sentiment. One study showed that deforestation actually 
increased by 240% during the period when military operations were ongoing,73 indicating that 
the raids were largely ineffective in thwarting illegal mining activity.  
 
71 “Peru Fights Gold Fever with Fire and Military Force - The Washington Post.” 
72 “Peru Fights Gold Fever with Fire and Military Force - The Washington Post.” 
73 “CINCIA Research Brief: Three Decades of Deforestation.” 
 47 
Evaluating Military Raids: Plan Breakdown 
In 2019, the Peruvian government launched the initial phase of Operation Mercury that 
included immediate action in the form of military interventions at a much larger scale than 
previous raids. To kick off the operation, president Martín Vizcarra declared a 60-day national 
emergency and dispatched 1200 National Police and an additional 300 Navy military members to 
combat illegal mining in Madre de Dios, especially in the La Pampa area.74 The operation was to 
be carried out in three phases. Phase one dedicated 14 days to evict illegal miners from a 2 km 
tract on the Interoceanic Highway. Phase two allotted 180 days to set up military bases in the 
area to prevent miners from re-entering, and phase three devotes two years to further establish 
the military bases and their long-term sustainability. Currently, the operation is in the midst of 
phase two. It is worth noting that the military raids targeted illegal miners operating in off-limits 
areas, like La Pampa within the Tambopata Reserve buffer zone, not informal miners operating 
within legal concessions or those who have initiated the formalization process. 
Cost: Expensive and Constant Drain on Resources  
S/200 million (~$60 million) were allocated to carry out this two- and half-year long 
military intervention, doubling the budget between 2013 and 2016 that saw 106 interdictions at 
the cost of S/93 million (~$27 million). 75 The S/200 million in funds goes towards paying for the 
1500 police and military officers as well as their equipment, transportation, housing, and other 
living costs throughout phase one. Interventions were conducted by air, land, and water, and 
teams from special forensic and explosives units were also onboarded. These are direct and high 
costs that cannot be recouped. Phase two is the “consolidation” phase, wherein the presence of 
 
74 “Madre de Dios: 1200 policías y 300 militares realizarán operativos contra minería ilegal,” SPDA Actualidad 
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the State is meant to be strengthened through the establishment of three temporary military 
bases, each one housing 100 military officers and 50 members of the National Police.76 
Maintaining an active military force in the region is an expensive endeavor that requires constant 
funding. Additionally, there seems to be no plan to exit the region anytime soon, indicating that 
this military engagement will be ongoing and require continuous injections of expensive 
resources. If funding were to be cut, a sudden removal of military forces could destabilize the 
area by creating a power vacuum that criminal organizations could step into. In a visit to La 
Pampa in May 2019, Minister of the Interior, Carlos Morán, announced that Operation Mercury 
would not cease to operate until illegal mining was completely eradicated in the region.77  
Impact: Operation Mercury Seeks to Address Surface Level Problems, Not Causal Factors 
 The stated goal of this military operation is to completely eradicate mining in illegal areas 
in the region by driving out the miners and re-installing government authority in the region.78 So 
far, findings show that the military raids are having significant, but short-term, effects. A report 
from the Monitoring of the Andean Amazon Project (MAAP) announced that since February of 
2019, the initiation of Operation Mercury, deforestation attributed to illegal mining is down 
92%.79 During the first phase of the operation, military personnel rescued 51 trafficking victims, 
arrested 80 illegal miners, and confiscated S/53 million worth of goods and mining equipment. 
This represents a significant jump from the smaller 2014 operation where only four miners were 
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arrested; however, as suggested by the results of the previous raids, the impacts are likely only 
short term if miners return shortly after military officers depart. 
 
 
Figure 11: During Operación Mercurio (image 3 to 4), the rate of deforestation from illegal 
mining was reduced 92% compared to the rate of deforestation during the same time period last 
year (image 1 to 2). 
 
If miners continued their operations shortly after military raids, we can predict that 
widespread illegal mining would continue shortly after the conclusion of this military operation. 
The military base would have to actively combat the illegal miners to deter their activity. Not 
only is this plan unsustainable from a funding perspective, but the miners’ quick return indicates 
that the root causes of illegal mining are not being appropriately addressed, namely supply-side 
and demand-side factors. Institutional weaknesses are being side-stepped by direct federal 
intervention through the use of military force, as regional governments have been unable to 
effectively police the area and much less address the underlying causes of illegal gold mining. 
Overall, the 2019 raids as part of Operation Mercury have significantly reduced mining activity 
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and deforestation in the area, but for now, these results are only temporary. As long as there is 
still gold in the ground, there will be people seeking it out. Long-term strategies are crucial for 
the success of Operation Mercury. 
Efficiency Score: High Cost + Low Impact = Highly Inefficient 
 Operation Mercury was twice as expensive as the total cost of the intermittent military 
raids that occurred from 2013 to 2016. However, if the new military bases create lasting impact 
by establishing authority in the region and thwarting illegal mining activity, then the military 
operation could be categorized as efficient: high-impact and high-cost. As the operation is still 
ongoing, the final efficiency score is yet to be determined. 
Fairness: Military Intervention Undermines Democracy 
 The military is directly confronting the miners in La Pampa, destroying their machines 
and burning their camps. Community members, who are obliged by law to report incidents of 
illegal mining and logging on their privately-owned forest concessions, are caught in the middle, 
threatened by miners who accuse them of reporting their activity to the police while facing steep 
fines for not disclosing illegal mining activity.80 Additionally, miners resent the military 
encroachment, further ingraining their anti-government sentiment. The military intervention 
claims to support formalization, but miners are less likely to cooperate with officials if they view 
the government negatively. This building resentment between small-scale miners and authority 
figures is evident in the escalation of violence during protests in Madre de Dios. In 2012, a pro-
mining protest in Puerto Maldonado turned deadly, resulting in 3 deaths and 55 injuries, 
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including 16 police officers.81 Small-scale miners organized by the Mining Federation of Madre 
de Dios (FEDEMIN) were unhappy with the newly announced Supreme Decree Nº 1102 that 
criminalized illegal mining for the first time, meaning that miners could face up to 10 years in 
prison instead of receiving a fine as was previously the case.82 In the protest, one mininf 
federation leader blamed the demonstrations on the government for “sataniz[ing] us and 
criminaliz[ing] us” through the new law.83 In 2015, another supreme decree established quotas 
on gasoline to prevent its use in illegal mining and logging, sparking months-long protests, road 
blockades, and tire burnings led by the illegal miners’ union.84 Miners have a history of reacting 
to legislative changes and government restrictions on their livelihoods by mobilizing against new 
punitive regulatory measures through protests, roadblocks, and general strikes, mechanisms they 
use to protect their livelihoods. If formalization is successful through the new military-backed 
program, then miners ideally should receive assistance in the transition to sustainable mining in 
approved areas, but the barriers to formalization are big and efforts to formalize have been 
largely unsuccessful as we will examine in the medium-term plans of Operation Mercury. 
Government entities should be cautious in further alienating the illegal miners through military 
operations, as they will be less likely to cooperate with formalization efforts later on.  
Political acceptability:  
 The use of force and military operations sends a clear message to the miners: you should 
not be here. The show of strength makes the national government and the president in power 
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look good to the general public–Humala (populist) enacted formalization efforts in 2012, PPK 
(center-right) pushed for Operation Mercury in 2019, and Vizcarra (also center-right) set his 
agenda to continue this plan. Despite having different political backgrounds, these presidents all 
pushed for immediate solutions to the illegal mining problem because it was a popular issue with 
voters in Lima and because they faced pressure from international actors such as the UN. Many 
anti-illegal mining efforts have been enacted through supreme decree, which functions similar to 
a U.S. executive order wherein the acting president can declare new laws and initiatives while 
bypassing the legislature. They send a message of presidential strength and effectiveness by 
enacting an action on paper, but in Latin America, these moves can be seen as authoritarian 
power grabs that undermine democracy and civil rights.   
 The state of emergency in Madre de Dios was extended on February 14, 2020 for another 
60 days. During a state of emergency, constitutional civil liberties relating to personal liberty and 
security, inviolability of the domicile, freedom of assembly, and transit in the territory are 
suspended.85 Latin America has a long history of authoritarian leaders who concentrate power 
and leadership in themselves, ruling through supreme decrees that undermine the legislative 
process. Suspension of civil liberties was often used as a method of oppression and control of the 
opposition in countries with military dictatorships in place, such as Argentina’s military junta 
and Chile’s Pinochet regime, which carried out systematic human rights violations to assert 
control and weed out opposition. Vizcarra recently dissolved Congress after it failed to agree on 
anti-corruption reforms, instituting a temporary legislative council in its place. Alberto Fujimori 
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used the same executive power with military backing in the 1990s when he was fighting Sendero 
Luminoso and MRTA terrorist organizations in Peru. Currently, Fujimori is serving the 
remainder of a 25-year prison sentence for human rights violations that occurred during his 
presidency. Vizcarra is already facing legal questions surrounding his dissolution of Congress 
with some accusing him of abusing his powers as president and undermining Peruvian 
democracy.86 Additionally, studies show that in Mexico, the military operations to stamp out the 
drug trade and instill public order resulted in a rapid spiral of human rights violations.87 Right 
now, Vizcarra’s moves in the region have generally been popular, but if Operation Mercury goes 
awry and violence escalates in the region (See “Other Considerations”), Vizcarra would be one 
step closer to suffering the same fate as Fujimori.   
Robustness and Replicability: Little Cause for Concern 
 I do not foresee any major issues with robustness and replicability under the present 
circumstances. As the result of direct military intervention, the federal government has 
essentially circumvented regional actors in order to pursue enforcement efforts, applying direct 
force where the military sees fit and reducing the potential for administerial inefficiencies 
hurting or slowing down action. The program should ensure that the promises for formalization 
assistance are honored, as the form in which these programs are administered affects the 
program’s overall level of impact. Any government could adopt a similar approach to combating 
illegal mining within their borders, and countries like Mexico and Colombia have resorted to 
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military force in efforts to control criminal activity, so the plan is replicable given appropriate 
funding but not ideal.  
Other considerations: Potential for Further Escalation of Violence 
 I mentioned that miners have in the past resorted to violence to defend their livelihoods. 
The government should be leery of using violent force to disperse the miners and destroy their 
operations because of the risk of further escalation of violence, especially given the involvement 
of criminal organizations in the region. It is well documented that violence increased 
substantially in Mexico after military forces cracked down on narcotraffickers. Illegal enterprises 
are known to utilize violence more readily since they operate outside of the law, meaning that 
they cannot rely on authorities to enforce contracts and agreements and protect themselves 
against other criminal actors.88 Additionally, illegal operators such as cartels rely on informal 
means such as violence to resolve conflicts or enact punishment on people who impede their 
proceedings.89 When Calderón became president in Mexico in 2006, he immediately launched 
military campaigns across Mexico to fight drug violence, sending out 45,000-50,000 troops to 
areas most affected by narcotrafficking. While homicide rates remained somewhat stable in the 
two years following the military incursion, national homicide rates rose 50% in 2008 and another 
50% in 2009. 90 The same study shows that violence was exacerbated in areas of military 
operations. In 2006, the homicide rate in the Mexican state of Chihuahua was 19.6 homicides per 
100,000 habitants. Military officers began to patrol Ciudad Juarez, the most populous city in 
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Chihuahua, in 2007. Homicide rates temporarily dipped to 14.4 homicides per 100,000 people, 
and then sharply increased to 75.2 and 108.5 homicides per 100,000 people in 2008 and 2009, 
respectively.91 Calderón’s initiative was the largest anti-drug campaign in Mexico, but not the 
first. Previous operations not only resulted in more instances of violence but also its spread from 
previously concentrated regions due to a “balloon effect.” By dispersing the narcotraffickers 
through military force, levels of violence in newly occupied geographic areas increased, 
revealing a pattern between the use of military force and escalation of violence in regions where 
illicit activity takes place. As mentioned earlier, drug cartels are thought to be active as gold 
buyers in Madre de Dios, using illegally mined gold as a means to launder drug profits in the 
















Figure 12. Operation Mercury–Military Incursions Evaluation. 
 While flexing military muscle poses social risks, the end goal still allows gold mining to 
happen in the region but in pre-approved concessions or mining areas. By first re-establishing 
order and authority in the region, the government authorities will wield more power in the region 
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to more effectively enact formalization programs and sustainable alternative industries in Madre 
de Dios.  
B. OPERATION MERCURY–MEDIUM-TERM STRATEGY: FORMALIZATION 
 Operation Mercury, enacted by Peruvian president Martin Vizcarra in 2019, takes a 
multi-pronged approach to combat the issue of illegal mining in Madre de Dios through direct 
military intervention in the region, evaluated in the previous section, and by pushing for long-
term sustainability investment and the continuation formalization efforts that have been ongoing 
since 2012.  
 Peru has long struggled with the question of what to do about its informal sector. 
Between 1985 and 2011, the informal economy was thought to comprise between 30% and 45% 
of the official GDP.93 Informality in the gold mining sector is particularly prevalent with an 
estimated 22% of gold mining exports representing approximately $1.79 billion in revenue 
estimated to come from illegal or informal sources.94 Formalizing the informal gold mining 
sector in Madre de Dios could be key not only for controlling environmental damage and 
managing public health risks but also for generating higher tax revenue for the region. The 
challenge lies in getting informal miners to actually complete the formalization process and 
eventually introducing mercury-free mining methods or ushering informal miners into other, 
more sustainable, industries such as agroforestry or ecotourism. 
 The push for formalization kicked off in 2012 under president Ollanta Humala who 
sought to increase formalization to boost tax revenue in the region. Supreme Decree Nº 1105 
establishes a formalization process for miners. To further urge miners to formalize, Humala 
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enacted Supreme Decree Nº 1102 which made illegal mining a criminal offense punishable by up 
to 10 years in prison when previously the infraction was treated as a civil violation subject to a 
fine. Despite establishing formalization procedures and criminalizing miners who did not initiate 
the process, only 3% of miners had formal concessions and environmental permits in 2012.95 
Currently, MINEM is pushing for the formalization of 4,500 miners in Madre de Dios who have 
already enrolled in the REINFO (Registro Integral de Formalización Minera).96 These miners 
would be allowed to mine in the mining corridor, an area of 5,000km2 with space for up to 2,800 
mining concessions. They would not be allowed to operate in La Pampa or other off-limits 
regions like national preserves and buffer-zone areas.  
Cost Factors: Expensive 
 The Peruvian government has allocated $160 million (S/500 million) for formalization 
and sustainable development efforts under Operación Mercurio. As of February 2019, 4,500 
miners in Madre de Dios have begun the formalization process out of an estimated 40,000 
miners.  
Impact: Low Adoption Rates as of Yet, But Some Progress 
 Informal ASGM causes harm in two ways: (1) working and living conditions and (2) lost 
tax revenue. Miners are often uneducated and/or use rudimentary tools and processes for gold 
extraction and processing, creating health risks from mercury exposure and environmental 
damage outlined in Chapter 2. Formalization creates a platform through which governments can 
better manage and mitigate health and environmental impacts by banning certain practices, 
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providing technological assistance, requiring environmental impact reports, etc.97 Informality is 
also a lost revenue opportunity, especially for poor regional governments such as Madre de Dios. 
Tax revenue from small-scale gold mining could generate an estimated $305 million per year 
across Peru.98 This money could be reinvested in the local economy, used to educate miners 
about mercury-free methods, and support sustainable development initiatives in gold mining and 
in other local industries such as fishing and agriculture as well.   
Because formalization does not aim to eradicate illegal gold mining, we cannot measure 
its impact based on the reduced mining activity. Instead we should measure the impact by the 
reduced negative environmental and health consequences of formalized small-scale mining as 
well as the estimated increased in tax revenue. Due to the barriers that miners face to formalize, 
adoption has been slow with few miners holding valid mining concessions and environmental 
permits. Low adoption = low impact.  
Overall Efficiency: Highly Inefficient 
 If 40,000 to 50,000 small-scale miners operate in Madre de Dios, our calculations would 
indicate that roughly 10% (4,500) of ASGM miners have at least initiated the formalization 
process since the beginning of Operation Mercury. For formalization to be a sustainable strategy 
from an economic perspective, each formalized miner would have to generate enough revenue 
for the government to recoup the initial costs of the formalization initiative, $160 million. 
Assuming that all 40,000 miners successfully completed the formalization process and paid their 
taxes every year, each miner would have to generate at least $400 per year in annual tax revenue 
($160 million/40,000 miners/10 years = $400/year) for the government to be able to recover its 
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initial investment in a 10-year period. One estimate places the annual income for a small-scale 
gold miner in Madre de Dios between $10,800 and $8,400.99 $9,600 is the midpoint between the 
maximum and minimum annual salaries and will serve as a proxy for our average annual income 
of a small-scale gold miner. The government would have to raise and collect a 4.17% income tax 
rate on miners ($400/$9,600*100 = 4.17%) to generate $400 per year per miner and recoup the 
costs over a 10-year period. However, the persistent informal nature of ASGM has frustrated 
formalization efforts, and effective tax collection is only possible through strong institutions. 
Operation Mercury will be unable to recover its formalization investment if it is unable to 
convince miners to formalize and pay taxes. 
Part C will provide evidence that governments can charge higher tax rates on miners to 
offset the environmental damage caused, so if all of the miners formalized, then the government 
could quickly recover its initial investment. 
Fairness: Respects Mining as an Occupation but Burdensome 
 While formalizing requires bureaucratic procedures, tax contributions, and miners’ 
adherence to environmental, safety, and labor standards, which are expensive for small-scale 
miners to implement in their current practices, formalization still provides ASGM as an 
economic option rather than forcing miners to halt their livelihoods completely. Formalization 
provides miners with the opportunity to enter the formal economy with full legal rights and 
responsibilities as legitimate businesses. While the government is still making adjustments to the 
actual process to reduce barriers for formalizing, the idea of formalization respects ASGM as a 
legitimate livelihood and treats miners with dignity. ASGM remains an important development 
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opportunity since gold mining is an excellent means for rural communities to generate wealth 
with small-scale miners often receiving 70% or more of the value of international prices,100 and, 
therefore, it should still be allowed to operate in limited areas to contribute to poverty reduction 
in rural regions. Formalization will help facilitate the transition to broad use of sustainable 
practices in ASGM by requiring operations to meet certain requirements and potentially giving 
miners access to loans for investing in sustainable production methods. 
Political Acceptability and Robustness: Governance Issues Creating Conflict 
Addressing illegal gold mining has proven to be a popular platform for presidential 
candidates during election cycles and to boost popularity once in office. Ollanta Humala, 
president from 2011 to 2016, implemented the formalization process to deliver on his campaign 
promise to raise additional tax revenue on formal in support of the fight against rural poverty. 
The new funds he intended to raise would be funneled to the development of sustainable 
economic opportunities in regions such as Madre de Dios. Humala failed to achieve widespread 
formalization of miners, so Pedro Pablo Kuczynski campaigned to provide a new impulse 
towards formalization, mostly by providing training and creating instructive manuals to educate 
miners on the established formalization process. Lack of knowledge about bureaucratic 
procedures for formalization was thought to be the main obstacle for implementation,101 but as 
we will discover, new regulatory decrees and weak legal rights due to weak regional institutions 
are the main obstacles preventing small-scale miner formalization. 
 To formalize, miners must complete the following requirements:102 
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1. Declare commitment to following the formalization process within the mining corridor. 
2. Acquire accreditation of ownership of concession or obtain a contract with a concession 
owner. 
3. Obtain authorization for the use of water. 
4. Adopt a plan for environmental impact mitigation and correction. 
5. Obtain final authorization to initiate mining operations. 
Additionally, mining operators are required to complete a certificate of training, a certificate of 
the absence of archeological remains, an authorization for the use of explosives, and 
accreditation as an ASGM enterprise.103  
 While on paper formalization seems like an attractive solution to managing ASGM in 
Madre de Dios, in practice, efforts to formalize have been largely unsuccessful because these 
steps have proved to be large barriers for miners who are accustomed to the informality of 
ASGM. The Formalization and Restructuring Plan for the mining sector in Madre de Dios was 
approved in 2011. By June 2014, 5,500 miners entered the formalization process, but only 11 
operators had completed step (2). By June 2016, five years later, still no SSM operation had 
completed the formalization process. Step (2) resulted in a significant barrier because 
approximately 74% of mining concessions were in conflict with other land-use concessions, 
making it difficult to acquire legal rights to operate as well as obtaining rights to water use.104  
Because of the complex nature of the legal rights and environmental regulations that 
underpin the formalization process, the plan, as designed, faces significant challenges for 
succeeding that undermine the original intent of the process, which is to formalize as many 
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small-scale miners as possible. This implies that formalization is not a robust action plan for 
Madre de Dios. The local government has not been able to solve conflicts in land-use 
concessions, limiting the ability for miners who have initiated the formalization process to obtain 
the necessary legal property rights required for step (2), and new regulatory decrees meant to 
protect the environment have been passed that limit mining near certain bodies of water, 
imposing further limitations on successfully completing step (3). The stagnant rate of 
formalization has led to the military intervention strategy of Operation Mercury that has only 
served to further confuse the process by forcing miners who are facing legal conflicts for 
concession rights into insurmountable bureaucratic hurdles. 
Even if the formalization process did not prove to be significantly burdensome, the 
institutional strength of the state in Madre de Dios is not strong enough to implement the 
formalization plan as designed. The Peruvian government essentially pushed formalization 
efforts as a way to install government authority in the area; however, the single biggest limiting 
factor in the process of formalization has been precisely the lack of governance in the region. In 
other words, formalization is meant to support institutional strength in the region, yet it is a 
process that requires government authority in order to install.  
Some argue that the lack of institutional strength can be explained partly by the 
government’s “conquest” approach in installing authority in the region. This argument contends 
that the state has relied on the formation of private mining companies that are self-governing to 
implement controls on labor conditions and environmental exploitation in far-reaching areas 
instead of strengthening local government institutions;105 However, alluvial gold is not an 
attractive target for large-scale mining operations because it is spread out through river systems 
 
105 Gerardo H. Damonte, “The ‘Blind’ State: Government Quest for Formalization and Conflict with Small-Scale 
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as fine particles and not concentrated in veins as is the case for gold ore of the highland regions, 
where multinational companies have mining operations. Therefore, no large extractive 
corporations exist to install some level of control and authority in Madre de Dios. The weakness 
of the local governments has impeded the formalization process because regional institutions are 
unable to support necessary steps such as securing property rights for mining concessions. The 
lack of institutional strength has other consequences such as corruption. Lower levels of 
government in Peru are more susceptible to corruption as there is less oversight from national 
governments as well as lucrative opportunities to undermine the law by turning a “blind eye” to 
illegal mining activities.106 Additionally, limited financial and technological resources due to 
lack of tax revenue from formal industries limit the assistance that regional and municipal 
governments are able to provide to aid ASGM miners in the formalization process. 
The challenge of formalization is extending regulation to informal miners who are 
accustomed to and comfortable with working outside of the formal economy, free from tax 
obligations and environmental regulations, and eventually introducing mercury-free mining 
methods or ushering informal miners into other, more sustainable, industries such as agroforestry 
or ecotourism. However, municipal governments, which are currently not strong enough to 
support legal proceedings, would have to play a major role in formalization efforts. 
Replicability 
Formalization can be a strategy that other countries import as a method of regulating and 
asserting authority in far reaching areas, but regional characteristics need to be paid attention to 
so as to avoid a disconnect between national policies and their intended effects on a regional 
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basis. Involving diverse participants such as regional ASGM practitioners in the policymaking 
process could close the gap between what different policies offer and the needs of local 
















Figure 13. Operation Mercury–formalization strategy evaluation. 
C. OPERATION MERCURY–LONG-TERM STRATEGY: INVESTING IN SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC 
ALTERNATIVES 
Encouraging formalization is just one aspect of Operation Mercury’s long-term action plan. 
The government intends to provide investment to foster sustainable development and alternative 
economic opportunities for those previously engaged in mining like ecotourism, aquaculture, and 
sustainable agriculture, among others, but so far, the plan is only in its second phase–the 
medium-term installment of military bases to establish regional control. Once established, 
Operation Mercury plans to invest significant capital into the development of sustainable 
economic opportunities for individual actors to discourage ASGM activities. A total of S/500 
 





million ($160 million) has been allocated to this endeavor, but crucial to the success of this plan 
are the mechanisms through which investment plans are decided and executed so as to maximize 
economic benefit and identify areas for future sustainable ventures.  
Costs: 
 The Peruvian government has promised S/500 million ($160 million) for sustainable 
development investment, but so far S/200 million ($64 million) has been approved. The Ministry 
of Production’s project PRODUCE (Desarrollo Productivo del Plan integral frente a la minería 
ilegal La Pampa) has set aside S/25 million ($7,550,000) for developing logging, brazil nut, 
cacao, fishing, and aquaculture projects in Madre de Dios.108 S/8.8 million has been invested in 
the Technological Innovation Center (CITE) with an additional S/8 million ($242,000) for 
equipment and infrastructure. The leftover funds (from the S/25 million) will go to the National 
Fisheries Development Fund (FONDEPES), S/233,500 ($71,000) of which will be used to train 
and assist 340 aquaculture producers and possibly S/9million ($2,700,000) of which will be used 
for the construction of an artisanal pier. 
 In Madre de Dios there are currently an estimated 150 formal fish farms. In May 2019, 
FONDEPES invested S/3.5 million in aquaculture in Madre de Dios to strengthen aquaculture 
and help make it a profitable venture and sustainable alternative to gold mining. Small business 
owners that take on loans to start aquaculture operations and participate in fairs about technical 
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assistance and capacitation are eligible for a one-year grace period on loan repayment and can 
cancel the debt 4 months after.109 
 Investing in sustainable enterprises is important not only for health and environmental 
conditions but also for regional infrastructure construction, institutional development, and 
poverty alleviation. An on-the-ground UN policy worker described ASGM as a “poverty trap.”110 
While miners are able to obtain high profits, most of it must be spent on high fixed and variable 
costs to keep the mining operation running. SSM requires expensive equipment that is often 
illegally smuggled in from Bolivia. Additionally, the fuel required to run the heavy machinery is 
strictly regulated and mostly comes at a premium via black markets. The government does not 
receive tax revenue from gold that is illegally smuggled out of the country, meaning that the 
government loses out on significant tax revenue that it could use for developing infrastructure, 
schools, hospitals, etc. Because potential tax revenue is lost, the government has limited funds 
for repairing the environmental wastelands left behind by illegal mining activity. This limits the 
options for future land use and damages the biological capital of Madre de Dios.  
 It is difficult to get people to switch their livelihoods, and it is also hard to displace the 
widespread belief that gold mining is highly profitable when that is not necessarily the case. We 
discussed the poverty trap, wherein mining operations require expensive illegally imported 
equipment and fuel while not contributing to the local economy. One study shows that fish 
farming and Brazil nut harvesting incomes are comparable and, under the right conditions, more 
 
109 “EL MINISTERIO DE LA PRODUCCIÓN ENTREGARÁ S/. 3.5 MM EN CREDITOS PARA EL 
DESARROLLO DE LA ACUICULTURA EN LA REGION MADRE DE DIOS,” FONDEPES, accessed May 12, 
2020, http://www.fondepes.gob.pe/Portal2018/index.php/blog/noticias-5/291-el-ministerio-de-la-produccion-
entregara-s-3-5-mm-en-creditos-para-el-desarrollo-de-la-acuicultura-en-la-region-madre-de-dios. 
110 “Local Perspectives on the Formalization of Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining in the Madre de Dios Gold 
Fields, Peru | Elsevier Enhanced Reader.” 
 67 
profitable than ASGM. Figure 14 compares the income ranges from these three activities to the 
average annual wage in Madre de Dios. While aquaculture brings in a slightly  
 
Figure 14. Annual income ranges in Madre de Dios from Brazil nut harvesting, aquaculture, and 
small-scale gold mining.111 
 
lower annual income, Brazil nut harvesting is actually slightly more profitable from these 
estimates. Right now, the aquaculture industry in Madre de Dios is relatively small with 150 
formal fish farmers in the region, but as the industry grows, it can be made more profitable with 
increasing economies of scale. More ponds created with the aid of collective digging would help 
fish farmers recoup their investments more quickly, and the increased volume of fish would 
lower transportation costs for the fish harvest to reach regional markets in Cusco, where fish can 
be sold at a higher price.112 Brazil nut harvesters can also boost their incomes through organic 
certification programs that would allow their products to command a higher market price, by 
collaborating on joint shelling facilities, and/or using unsold nuts as fish feed.113 Figure 15 
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compares annual incomes between Brazil nut harvesting, fish farming, and informal gold mining 
after profit-increasing measures have been taken. Government agencies and NGOs could provide 
assistance to help boost profits for sustainable enterprises, significantly increasing their annual 
incomes and making sustainable alternatives more attractive than ASGM. 
 
 
Figure 15. Income from sustainable alternatives to informal gold mining have the potential to far 
surpass the average annual income generated in Madre de Dios with appropriate measures taken 
to achieve competitive prices.114  
 
Cost: 
 The government has pledged S/500 million ($160 million) to sustainable development in 
Madre de Dios to support economic alternatives to ASGM, which creates significant health and 
environmental risks while not contributing to the local economy. With an estimated population 
of 140,000 people where 70% of the economy is tied to gold mining,115 the funds would have to 
be efficiently used to transition 98,000 people (70% of 140,000 people) away from mining or 
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mining-related occupations to sustainable economic alternatives. This would mean that the 
government could spend approximately S/5,100 (~$1500) per person (S/500 million divided by 
98,000 people in mining-related occupations). The actual amount of potential investment per 
person would be a lot less in reality because of overhead expenses needed to operate government 
agencies that would fund and oversee loans, infrastructure investments, and technical assistance 
programs. We also have to account for misallocation of funds and corruption that can take place 
at national and regional levels, as has happened in the past.  
For aquaculture, the cost of building a new pond is $1850, and it usually takes two years 
to recoup the investment.116 Government-sponsored small business loans could significantly help 
with the startup costs. Another avenue for high-impact investing, the regional government could 
consider buying refrigerated trucks (~$10,000 new), which would provide fish farmers with 
better access to regional markets and higher prices. One pond can produce up to 550kg of fish 
year, so a fish farmer who has access to regional markets where prices are higher ($5.15/kg at 
regional markets instead of $3.50/kg at local markets) can earn ($5.15/kg - $3.5/kg)*550 kg = 
$907.50 in additional profit per pond per year. Fish farmers with more ponds can benefit from 
higher output volume that boosts revenue and profit by further reducing average costs associated 
with transport.  
Impact:  
 As shown in the previous section, the profit per fish farmer means that aquaculture is a 
viable alternative to gold mining. The problem is getting people to make the switch. There are 
roughly 40,000 illegal and informal ASGM miners in Madre de Dios and only 140 formalized 
fish farmers. An additional 58,000 are employed in mining-related occupations. If even a portion 
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of these people switched to fish farming, not only would the environmental and health costs of 
ASGM be reduced but a significant amount of tax revenue could be generated for the 
government to inject into sustainable development projects and regional infrastructure. 
Aquaculture would also increase food security in the region. The figure below estimates the 
potential tax base and income tax revenue (at a 5% tax rate) that Madre de Dios could generate 
from providing capital and technical assistance for aquaculture operations. 
# of Fish Farmers  
(1 Pond/Farmer) 
Total Income per Year 
(W/ Access to Regional 
Prices) 
5% Income Tax Revenue 
per Year 
140 (current level) 140*550kg*$(5.15-2.26) = 
$222,530 
$11,126.50 
2000 2000*550kg*$2.89 = 
$3,179,000 
$158,950 
5000 5000*550kg*$2.89 = 
$7,947,500 
$397,375 
29,140 (50% of 58,000 mining-





Per pond, if the fish farmer can generate an additional $907.50 in income with access to regional 
markets, then by taxing profits at a 5% rate, the government can generate $45.35 per additional 
aquaculture pond. Currently, ASGM generates S/42,000 ($12,181) per year in total government 
revenue for Madre de Dios while forcing expensive mitigation efforts for the health and 
environmental damage caused.117 Currently, gold mining in Madre de Dios is estimated to 
produce S/1.6 billion per year.118 This means that the regional government could receive an 
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estimated S/50 to 200 million per year from gold mining tax revenue.119 S/200 million generated 
from S/1.6 billion in gold production revenue would imply a 12.5% tax rate. Our calculations 
only assume a 5% tax on aquaculture profits, the higher tax rate on revenue from gold mining 
would make sense. Aquaculture does not create the environmental destruction that gold mining 
does, so lower taxes could be an additional positive incentive to pursue alternative to ASGM.  
Efficiency: (Potentially) Highly Efficient 
 The government can fully recoup the costs of sustainable development through taxes, 
bringing the net cost to a far lower level than the value of damage by gold mining, and 
sustainable economic activities have few to none of the negative health and environmental 
effects that gold mining has while increasing food security in the region. Assuming that all $160 
million were invested in fish ponds (x) and refrigerated trucks (y) to bring the fish production to 
regional markets, excluding overhead costs, the regional government could recoup its initial 
investment at a 5% tax rate in approximately 7 years while providing an income of $15,875 per 
year for 28,856 fish farmers in Madre de Dios.  
 We can demonstrate this result using a simple system of equations: 
1. $160,000,000 = $1,850x + $10,000y, where x= # of fishponds and y = # of trucks. 
The first equation sets our total investment fund of $160 million equal to a combination of x 
fishponds and y trucks, which represents the number of fishponds and trucks we can potentially 
invest in at their relative prices of $1,850 and $10,000. 
2. (365 truck trips per year) * (1000kg full capacity) * y= (550kg of fish per year) * x 
Since trucks have a maximum load capacity of 1000kg per truck, we must calculate the optimal 
ratio of trucks to ponds to invest in. If we have too many trucks, the average transportation cost 
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increases, eroding overall profits for the fish farmers. If we have too few trucks, then only some 
of the fish production will be able to reach the regional markets with higher prices. Each truck 
can make the return trip from Puerto Maldonado to the regional market in Cusco once a day, or 
365 days per year, carrying a maximum of 1000kg of fish per trip. Each pond produces 550kg of 
fish per year. Solving for the ratio of ponds to trucks yields: 
3. x/y = ~664 ponds serviced per truck 
We can isolate x or y, and plug it back into equation (1), yielding: 
4. Plug back into (1): x = 288,563 ponds, y = ~129 trucks 
Our solution indicates that we should invest in 288,563 fishponds at $1,850 each and 129 trucks 
at $10,000 each to achieve an optimal ratio of fish ponds to refrigerated trucks. 
If each fish farmer owns 10 ponds, which is the maximum possible number of ponds per 
concession, the government can fund 28,856 fish farmers (288,563 ponds/ 10 ponds per 
concession). With 10 ponds, a fish farmer can earn an annual income of $15,875 per year:  
1. 550kg of fish per pond*$2.89 profit/kg*10 ponds = $15,875 annual income 
At a 5% tax rate and if trucks make the trip every day for ~1.64 years (We are assuming that the 
trucks have 500,000 lifetime miles and the return trip between Puerto Maldonado and Cusco is 
833 miles. Each truck can then make about 600 lifetime trips. ~600 lifetime trips/365 trips per 
year ≈ 1.64 years), the government can breakeven on its investment in approximately 7.23 years 
We find this breakeven point using the following equations: 
1. Profit = Tax Revenue - Variable Costs (Replacing Truck Fleet) - Fixed Costs 
We adapt the typical profit equation (profit = revenue – costs) to fit our theoretical government’s 
model. The regional government generates revenue by taxing the fish farmers. Its variable costs 
 73 
would be replacing the trucks every 1.64 years, and its fixed costs would be the initial $160 
million cost of the fishponds and refrigerated trucks. 
2. Tax Revenue = ($15,875) * (28,856 Farm Fisheries) * 0.05 Tax Rate = $22,904,450/year  
To calculate tax revenue, we multiple a fish farmer’s expected annual income times the total 
number of fish farming operations times our assumed tax rate of 5%. Our expected annual tax 
revenue would thus be $22,904,450. 
3. Variable Costs = 129 Trucks * $10,000 / 1.64 Lifetime Years ≈ $786,500 per year 
To calculate total variable costs per year, we multiply our initial 129 trucks by their $10,000 
price tag and divide the total by 1.64 years, which is the average number of years that each truck 
runs before needing to be replaced. To maintain the transportation operations, we must spend 
$786,500 on truck replacements. 
4. Fixed Cost = $160,000,000 initial investment 
Our fixed cost is the $160 million initial investment made to startup the fishponds and the initial 
fleet of trucks. 
5. Revenue = Variable Costs + Fixed Costs 
To find the number of years it would take for the fishpond scheme to turn a profit, we must find 
the year where total revenue equals total costs. We can rearrange the profit formula to Fixed 
Costs = Revenue – Variable Costs, and plugging in our previous calculations yields: 
6. $160,000,000 = $22,904,450y - $786,500y 
7. $160,000,000 = ($22,117,950) * y 
8. y = $160,000,000/$22,117,950 = 7.23 years 
This model is an oversimplification, as likely the variable costs would be much higher when 
taking fuel and drivers’ wages into account, and we are assuming that all $160 million were 
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invested directly into ponds and refrigerated trucks when there would likely be significant 
overhead costs. Additionally, the calculations only consider trucks carrying one load from Puerto 
Maldonado to Cusco with an empty return trip, so the government could further increase revenue 
by transporting other goods on the trip back. We would also have to set some money aside to 
provide informational workshops and technical assistance for new fish farmers. Distribution and 
allocation of funds for development projects could negatively impact efficiency if the process is 
weighed down by bureaucratic proceedings, so the national and regional governments should 
consider this when deciding on an implementation strategy.  
 The difference in tax revenue from aquaculture and gold mining raises an important 
point: gold mining should be allowed on a limited basis in designated areas because of the wealth 
it could potentially bring to the region that it currently does not, as demonstrated by a simple 
optimization problem. We established that a fish farmer with 10 ponds has the potential to earn 
$15,875 per year. At a 5% tax rate, each fish farmer would generate $793.75 tax dollars without 
any negative environmental impacts that the tax dollars would have to mitigate. Madre de Dios 
generates an estimated S/1.6 billion of gold per year and the estimated lost tax revenue is S/200 
million, which would imply an 12.5% tax rate. With 40,000 miners operating in Madre de Dios, 
each miner could generate S/5000 per year in taxes:  
1. S/1.6 billion in total gold revenue divided by 40,000 miners = S/40,000 revenue 
per miner. 
2. S/40,000 * 0.125 = S/5000 in taxes per miner ($1,460). 
This is about 84% more tax revenue per person than what aquaculture produces, but along with 
the extra tax dollars, miners create significant environmental damage. Striking the right balance 
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between lower-tax yield but environmentally friendly sustainable industries and high-yield but 
exploitative gold mining is the key to bringing responsible prosperity to Madre de Dios. 
Fairness 
 The government’s investment in sustainable development is very fair as they are 
providing positive economic incentives for switching to alternative occupations instead of 
enforcing punitive measures for engaging in illegal mining activity as the military incursions into 
La Pampa have done. 
Political Acceptability and Robustness 
 Sustainability is a big buzz word in politics, especially in global climate change politics 
and in reference to developing countries where poverty poses major threats to the environment in 
a country such as Peru with vast natural resources that are ripe for exploitation. However, 
securing funding for these initiatives can be difficult when many infrastructure projects and 
social programs are competing for the same funds. Peru has the potential to gain access to 
development funding from the UN or other international organizations that support sustainability 
initiatives, which could be used to sponsor aquaculture and other responsible industries in Madre 
de Dios.  
 The implementation plan for Operación Mercurio’s sustainable development initiative 
largely leaves financing decisions to the local agencies such as CITE and FONDEPES. While 
S/500 million have been promised, only S/200 million have been approved and transferred to 
regional government agencies in Madre de Dios, indicating that transferring funds from the 
national to the local level may face obstacles. The funding that does reach the hands of local 
agencies could be misallocated, used inefficiently or stolen by corrupt officials.  
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Replicability 
 The plan essentially transfers funds from national to local government agencies to be 
used for the promotion of sustainable job opportunities. There is a lot of flexibility as to how that 
would be achieved on a local level, so other countries can take local factors into consideration 
















Figure 16. Operation Mercury–sustainable investment evaluation. 
D. MERCURY SUPPLY CHAIN CONTROLS UNDER THE MINAMATA CONVENTION AND 
PLANETGOLD 
On October 10th, 2013, Peru ratified the Minamata Convention, an international treaty 
between 128 countries to address and coordinate international controls on the primary production 
and trade of mercury. In Japan, industrial mercury waste caused the highly toxic metal to 
bioaccumulate in the marine food chain of Minamata Bay, creating a widespread outbreak of 
mercury poisoning and shedding light on the global issue of mercury pollution. In an attempt to 
prevent the tragic long-term consequences of the Japanese incident from occurring again in other 
places, 128 countries signed an agreement to develop domestic policies and cross-border trade 
agreements that would eventually limit or completely halt the production of mercury, and strictly 
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control mercury supplies that are produced and used. The largest global anthropogenic 
contributor to atmospheric mercury is ASGM, comprising an estimated 37% of total atmospheric 
mercury output due to the rudimentary mercury amalgamation process that miners use to extract 
and refine gold ore.120 Countries such as Peru that signed the agreement and are significant 
producers of mercury pollution ASGM are required to submit a National Action Plan to the 
Minamata Convention Secretariat, detailing their plans for mitigating domestic mercury 
pollution from ASGM activities. However, questions arise about whether the pledges made 
under the Minamata Convention on mercury will effectively help to control mercury waste in 
Peru by limiting access to mercury for illegal miners who use it as a cheap ore processing 
method gold. 
 The articles of the Minamata Convention aim to eliminate anthropogenic mercury 
pollution through several means. Countries that ratify the convention treaty agree to prohibit all 
primary extraction of mercury within 15 years of ratification, disclose any stores of mercury 
greater than 50 tonnes and identify sources that generate 10 or more tonnes of mercury per year, 
install measures to dispose of excess mercury from industrial waste, and create an authorization 
procedure for cross border mercury movements, among many other requirements.121 
Additionally, Peru, as a significant generator of ASGM-related mercury pollution, is required to 
submit a National Action Plan (NAP) before proceeding with its own domestic implementation 
measures. 
 After ratifying the Minamata Convention in 2013, Peru set out with the assistance of the 
Artisanal Gold Council (AGC) and further support from the Global Affairs Canada and Red 
Social to develop a National Action Plan (NAP), as required by the treaty, with the aim of 
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reducing mercury emissions from ASGM in Peru. This project, called MEJORO (Mejorando la 
Pequeña Minería Artesanal de Oro en el Perú), aims to tackle the problem of mercury pollution 
through three main mechanisms: (1) helping miners to implement gravimetric ore processing 
systems and other practices that protect environmental, health, and safety conditions, (2) 
providing support for national, regional, and local governments to aid their formalization 
processes for ASGM and environmental impact standards, and (3) helping to create a transparent 
supply chain for artisanal gold that allows “its tracking from the mines to the international 
markets,” giving miners access to premium prices for their gold.122 While the pilot project is 
currently underway, Peru approved its National Action Plan on April 18, 2019, and currently, the 
Peruvian Ministry of Energy and Mining (MINEM) and the Ministry of the Environment 
(MINAM) are collaborating to formulate and implement the tasks set out in the NAP in 
accordance with the agreements of the articles of the Minamata Convention. To involve local 
actors in the creation of the plan and approach the implementation in a decentralized way, 
MINEM and MINAM recently held participatory workshops where regional leaders could 
provide feedback for parts of the national proposal for reducing mercury in Peruvian ASGM.123 
Through the whole ore amalgamation process described in Chapter 2, an estimated 44 to 
50 tonnes of mercury are released into the environment in Madre de Dios per year.124 From its 
elemental form used in mining, mercury does not break down but is transformed into 
methylmercury by bacteria that then accumulates in riverbanks, plants, fish, and, farther up the 
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food chain, in people, so people living in or near SSM operations are not only exposed to 
mercury contamination from mercury vapor but also from consuming fish or drinking water 
contaminated with bio-accumulated methylmercury. The devastating health effects of mercury 
are well documented (See Chapter 2.). Both forms of mercury, elemental (used in ore 
processing) and methylmercury (bioaccumulated form), cause significant long-term harm to 
miners. Despite the health risks, miners continue to use mercury in the gold amalgamation 
process because it is quick and easy to use as well as cheap. Gravimetric ore processing methods 
that are promoted by the Minamata Convention and other international actors as a sustainable 
small-scale mining method involve expensive technological investments that many miners are 
unable or unwilling to afford.  
 While the Minamata Convention and Peru’s National Action Plan represent the first 
instance of international collaboration on controlling and regulating the global supply chain of 
mercury, some experts have cast doubt on the effectiveness of these measures. One Yale 
researcher claims that global efforts to control mercury have merely changed the nature of 
mercury production and trade in Latin America.125 While the U.N. (Spain) and the U.S., the 
world’s two leading mercury producers, banned mercury exports altogether in 2010, Mexico and 
Indonesia increased production, becoming the leading exporters in 2016. Domestic production of 
mercury in Peru was banned from use in mining, but imported mercury was allowed to be used 
for ASGM until 2015 when Peru stopped mercury imports altogether. While mercury imports 
have halted, ASGM miners are still using mercury in their ore processing, indicating the 
emergence of a black-market supply from Bolivia, which closely borders Madre de Dios. 
Between 2014 and 2015, mercury exports from Mexico to Peru dropped from 94 to 9 tonnes, 
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while exports to Bolivia increased from 24 to 138 tonnes.126 Additionally, Peruvian officials 
have seized illegal shipments of mercury near the border with Bolivia. The emergence of a 
mercury black market is a challenge for Peruvian enforcement of the Minamata Convention. 
Another researcher claims that measures enacted through the Minamata Convention can 
only be successful in eliminating harmful mercury use through one of the following ways: (1) 
limiting or eradicating mercury supply, (2) regulating the market by discouraging the purchase of 
mercury through the introduction of mercury-free mining methods or eliminating ASGM activity 
completely, and (3) regulating mercury use.127 The researcher claims that (1) is not possible in a 
timely manner because the limits on primary mercury production agreed to through the treaty do 
not kick in for fifteen years after a country has ratified the Minamata Convention, and damage in 
Madre de Dios may be irreparable by that point as ratification itself could take years to pass 
through a country’s legislature. Unfortunately, (2) is also unlikely because there are few options 
for gold ore processing, none of which are as cheap or easy-to-use as mercury and shutting down 
all illegal gold mining activity in Madre de Dios would take extensive military action and 
enforcement of the law in difficult terrain. If gold prices remain high, rent seekers will continue 
to flock to the Amazon to mine for gold. Lastly, (3) would approach the reduction of harmful 
mercury pollution by regulating its use, which is difficult considering all of uses to which 
mercury is put outside of gold mining–technology, medical devices, industrial processes, even 
dentistry. Following the mercury regulations outlined by Peru’s National Action Plan could 
vastly improve public health, the environment, and the economy. Limiting the burning of 
amalgam could significantly decrease mercury vapor inhaled by miners and released into the 
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surrounding environment, reducing bioaccumulation.128 This could drastically improve public 
health statistics that show worrisome levels of mercury in hair tests of miners and in studies of 
Amazonian fish that are commonly consumed. However, we would expect miners’ compliance 
with mercury burn bans to be low in the absence of a viable technological alternative for 
processing gold ore. Also, illegal miners already break the law by using illegal dredging 
equipment or operating in protected areas–why would they suddenly comply with a new law? 
Additionally, regulating the illegal mining industry could bring in an estimated $305 million in 
taxes each year, if done properly, but raising taxes on formal mining activity has failed in the 
past and as we discussed, previously discussed, formalization efforts have proven challenging. 
 In addition to enacting legislation to regulate mercury supplies, MINAM and MINEM 
have partnered with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) on a program called planetGOLD that aims to help Peru and 8 other countries 
comply with Article 7 of the Minamata Convention, which requires countries to develop a 
National Action Plan to reduce mercury-use in ASGM mining. In Peru, the project aims to 
reduce mercury emissions by 15 tonnes in 5 years.129 planetGOLD approaches the issue through 
4 strategies: (1) strengthening institutions, evaluating formalization policies, and creating 
educational materials to help facilitate formalization, (2) providing loans for mercury-free small-
scale mining technology and facilitating direct market access for better prices, (3) providing 
technical assistance for mercury-free technology and practices, (4) developing outreach and 
communication materials to educate miners and stakeholders about the dangerous effects of 
mercury and its role in the gold supply chain. The project launched in January 2020 in Arequipa, 
Piura, and Puno, three other areas with informal mining activity in Peru, with a budget of ~$4.35 
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million. Components 1, 2, 3, and 4, will each receive $650,000, $1,525,000, $1,175,000, and 
$250,000, respectively.130 ~$360,000 will go toward the agency fee for GEF partners. The 
program is still in its infancy, so there is no data available about its current impact.  
Cost: 
planetGOLD received $4.35 million in funding.131 Ratification and early implementation of the 
Minamata Convention on Mercury generated $65,000 in expenses.132 The National Action Plan 
on Mercury in the Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining Sector in Peru costs $500,000, which 
was paid for with financial support from GEF.133 
Impact 
 The Minamata Convention aims to restrict and control the international mercury supply, 
which would place upward price pressure on illegally smuggled mercury in Peru, and in theory, 
discourage illegal mining activity by eroding profitability. However, as one researcher pointed 
out, the strict controls on the mercury supply likely led to the emergence of a black market in 
Madre de Dios. Peru has stopped importing mercury, yet the ASGM miners all are able to 
acquire it for their operations, and evidence from international mercury exports and imports 
show a sharp uptick in mercury exports from Mexico to Bolivia and exports to Peru decreased.  
Additionally, the ultimate beneficiaries of the illegally mined gold would likely be 
criminal organizations, so the demand-side of the equation is unaffected. Criminal organizations 
still want to use gold for money laundering. Gold miners could charge higher prices for their 
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production, passing the added cost of mercury to the buyer, but small gold miners are unlikely to 
have much pricing power. Since gold is a commodity, markets like the London Bullion Market 
set global prices, leaving little room for negotiation between primary producers and middlemen. 
Some organizations could resort to using forced labor tactics to extract gold at a cheaper cost, as 
some reports have shown evidence of labor abuse in the area already.134  
If planetGOLD succeeds in its initial projects and is successful in widely introducing 
mercury-free processes to ASGM in Peru, then a similar program could be applied in Madre de 
Dios. 50 tonnes of mercury are at stake in Madre de Dios and 145 tonnes across Peru. 
planetGOLD has a rather conservative goal of reducing mercury waste by 15 tonnes over the 
course of the five-year project. At a price tag of $4.35 million, planetGOLD spends $290,000 to 
reduce one tonne of mercury, not including startup costs. On the open market, mercury is sols in 
flasks, and each flask weighs approximately 36kg. At $2000 per flask of mercury (2018 price), 
one tonne of mercury would cost $58,823.53 on the market. planetGOLD should therefore aim to 
reduce mercury pollution in Peru by at least 73.9 tonnes of Hg ($4.35 million/$58,823.53) to 
reach the break-even point. If not, GEF is better off buying up flasks of mercury on the open 
market to restrict supply than invest in the planetGOLD project. However, the $4.35 million 
price tag of the five-year pilot project in Peru includes startup costs, so each additional tonne of 
mercury reduced would actually be less expensive than $290,000 to eliminate from 
environmental waste. If startup costs represented 25% of the $4.35 million, then the marginal 
cost of each tonne of mercury reduced is $217,500, which is still substantially higher than the 
market price of $58,823.53 per tonne of mercury. To be efficient, planetGOLD should, therefore, 
further reduce the marginal cost per tonne of mercury reduced to at least ~$44,000 per tonne of 
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Hg so that the project achieves the same level of mercury waste reduction as simply buying 
flasks of mercury on the market. 
 
Figure 17. planetGOLD break even analysis. 
Efficiency: 
 Overall, the mechanisms enacted by the ratification of the Minamata Convention in Peru 
alone will not solve the problem of mercury pollution in Madre de Dios, but the convention is a 
good launch point to encourage international collaboration to regulate mercury and prevent its 
use for illicit purposes like illegal gold mining. The controlling the burgeoning mercury black 
market and enforcing ASGM compliance with mercury regulations need to be achieved in Peru 
before the country sees improvement in environmental and health-related consequences of heavy 
mercury use. Luckily, the current administration under Vizcarra is attentive to the issues caused 
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by mercury use, so hopefully, further controls on cross border smuggling can be enacted in a 
timely manner to prevent further damage in Madre de Dios.  
 planetGOLD is meant to support Peru in reducing the amount of mercury used in ASGM; 
however, the project should seek to reduce the marginal cost of mercury per tonne eliminated 
from ASGM use to equal the number of tonnes that the $4.35 million project budget could buy 
on the open market, or 74 tonnes. As planetGOLD is only a pilot project, cost per tonne 
eliminated will naturally be higher at the start due to fixed overhead costs but targeting the cost 
per tonne of mercury eliminated to the market price of mercury should be a goal for future 
phases to achieve efficiency. 
Fairness: 
 The investment opportunities created by planetGOLD for implementing mercury-free 
practices are a positive consequence for gold miners that does not jeopardize their livelihoods 
and improves their health and safety conditions while also eliminating mercury emission. With 
formalization, however, the loss of jobs for intermediaries in the illegal gold supply chain poses 
substantial risk for threats to planetGOLD and similar initiatives and increased criminal 
activities.135 The emergence of a mercury black market is one example of new criminal activity 
sparked by mercury-free initiatives; however, providing more job opportunities in alternative 
sustainable industries or in the formalized gold supply chain could be one way of mitigating this 
risk.136 
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Political Acceptability and Robustness 
 The Minamata Convention and planetGOLD are global initiatives spurred from the “top” 
of the political ladder and not always in collaboration with on-the-ground stakeholders–miners or 
unions like FEDEMIN that ultimately determine the how effective the program will be through 
their active participation in adopting mercury-free methods and formalizing. Involving diverse 
interest groups in policy making will improve the design and implementation of future projects, 
improving robustness.  
Replicability 
 128 countries have signed the Minamata Convention, and 119 countries have ratified the 
treaty within their legislatures. Now countries are developing their national action plans and 
working towards the requirements set out in the articles on the agreement. planetGOLD is 
currently helping 8 countries, including Peru, to be compliant with Article 7 of the convention 
















Figure 18. Mercury supply controls evaluation. 
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Chapter 6:  Prospective Solutions to Control the Gold Supply Chain 
The actions taken by the Peruvian government so far have aimed to increase governance 
through military action, facilitate the formalization process to provide a platform for enacting 
environmental and labor standards, and usher small-scale miners towards more sustainable 
economic opportunities through direct investment and Minamata mercury restrictions. There still 
remains opportunity to strengthen these efforts through smart investment and effective gold 
supply chain management that creates end-to-end accountability for produced gold. The 
formation of a traceable gold supply chain would help hold companies responsible for their gold 
sourcing practices, and it would make money laundering more difficult for criminal 
organizations. And the question remains, could the over S/700 million used to fund Operation 
Mercury and Minamata projects have been used to reduce the damage caused in Madre de Dios 
more efficiently with the support of other strategies? 
From Chapter 2 we learned that criminal organizations use gold as a means to 
launder money and finance their operations, fueling demand for illegally mined gold. The lack of 
transparency in the gold supply chain provides a perfect cover for actors using gold for illicit 
means while also hiding the origins of newly mined gold and the conditions under which it was 
produced. As we have learned, ~20% of the gold in a wedding band or in the bullion pieces in 
our bank vaults was likely produced through ASGM with mercury-enabled processes that 
damage human health and the environment. As end consumers in developed countries have 
become more aware of the conditions under which one-fifth of the world’s gold is produced, 
demand has started to shift towards responsibly produced gold.137 Meeting this consumer 
demand will not only help to improve conditions on the supply-side of the equation but will also 
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create traceability and accountability throughout the gold supply chain, making it more difficult 
for cartels and terrorist organizations to infiltrate gold markets as a financing mechanism. The 
diamond industry has seen marked improvement in its traceability through the Kimberley 
Certification Process to meet customer demand for conflict-free diamonds, and the gold mining 
industry should take note. Groundwork has already been laid out through the Fairtrade Gold 
Certification program that pays miners a premium for their production for using responsible, 
mercury-free processing methods. Blockchain-based supply management platforms could 
support weaknesses from gold certification programs. Chile’s ENAMI is a government-
sponsored entity that buys and processes copper ore from small-scale miners while also 
providing them with technical and financial support. These cases provide intriguing solutions for 
enacting controls on the gold supply to meet buyer-side demands. 
A. RESPONSIBLE GOLD CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS: EXAMPLES FROM FAIRTRADE AND THE 
KIMBERLEY PROCESS 
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) was established in 2000 to prevent 
the trade in conflict diamonds (“blood diamonds”) with promising results: 99.8% of the world 
diamond production is accounted for through this certification process.138 The international 
certification scheme was created by the United Nations General Assembly and currently has 54 
participants, representing 81 countries. Like the Minamata Convention, participation in KPCS is 
voluntary, but member countries must meet certain requirements to participate in the conflict-
free diamond trade and to prevent non-certified diamonds from infiltrating the market. These 
requirements include ratifying legislation to require that all diamond imports or exports be 
certified through KPCS and to impose diamond trade prohibitions with non-KPCS member 
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countries. But the enforcement of these laws is largely up to the participating country itself. All 
shipments of diamonds leaving for or entering a country must have a Kimberley Process 
Certificate with information like country of origin, carat weight, value of shipment in USD, 
number of parcels in the shipment, and a certificate validation by the exporting authority among 
other things. KPCS handles diamonds purchased before 2003 (the year KPCS was implemented) 
in the following way: they recommend that diamond owners seeking to sell these diamonds 
indicate a supposed place of origin to the best of their knowledge with a statement from the 
original seller confirming this information to provide evidence that the diamonds were produced 
in conflict-free areas.139 This methodology is vague and allows room for falsifying 
documentation. 
         While, the main intention of KPCS was to “stop the trade in conflict diamond and ensure 
that diamond purchasers were not financing violence by rebel movements seeking to undermine 
legitimate governments,”140 this goal has been largely achieved on paper with the high 
percentage of world diamond trade certified through KPCS; however, a loophole exists in 
KPCS’s definition of “conflict diamond” as it does not account for potential human rights abuses 
in mining operations because diamond sales can still support government regimes, corrupt or not. 
This has been a major problem in Zimbabwe upon discovery of alluvial diamond deposits in the 
Marange fields. The discovery led to an influx of illegal miners before the army seized control of 
the diamond fields in 2008. Under the control of a corrupt military force, blatant human rights 
abuses occurred in these mining fields. Over 200 miners were massacred. In response to these 
reports, KPCS banned diamond imports from and exports to Zimbabwe in 2009. In 2011 they 
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lifted the ban, but this same year, BBC discovered mining camps where corrupt officials 
recruited illegal workers for diamond mining. The failure to set standards for preserving the 
basic human rights for diamond miners leaves them vulnerable to poor labor conditions and 
abuses by corrupt officials in government-owned mines.141 KPCS does not set any environmental 
standards for countries to abide by either. 
The Kimberley Process still needs work.142 It could benefit from a uniform enforcement 
policy as well as uniform punishments across countries for breaching laws to ensure participant 
compliance. While a country’s respective government can control its certified diamond import or 
export, it has little control over the conditions of the mines themselves. Placing more security 
forces near mines would reduce the number of unlicensed or illegal miners, but guards can be 
corrupt or serve a corrupt regime as in Zimbabwe. A government under a corrupt regime could 
also forge certificates, undermining the whole purpose of the certification process. The 
Kimberley Process has “observers” who help monitor the effectiveness of the KPCS, but an 
independent monitoring system to track mining conditions does not exist. Only recently have 
other groups begun to step in. The Responsible Jewelry Council, an KP “observer,” set a Code of 
Practices for member countries to follow in areas related to human rights, working conditions, 
health and safety, and transparency.143 
         The measures by which the Kimberley Process has managed to curb the sale of blood 
diamonds to fund civil wars to the extent it has should be built and improved upon to extend 
similar certification processes to other valuable and exploitable minerals like gold. The Fairtrade 
Certification has made significant leaps in this effort to improve transparency or origin in the 
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gold supply chain. Currently, it is impossible for consumers to know where and under what 
conditions the gold in end-products was mined. Fairtrade is a “closed-pipe” system that 
establishes the traceability of gold using the classic license model, similar to the KPCS. 
However, the Fairtrade Organization has strict international standards for miners and traders to 
comply with at all levels of the supply chain for certification.144 These standards include 
measures for environmental, health, and safety regulations in mining communities as well as 
processing and handling gold at the trader level. Fairtrade can provide physical traceability of 
gold from the miners to the refiners for mass balanced gold and can provide documentary 
traceability all the way to the end Fairtrade-certified product. In exchange for complying with 
these exhaustive standards, Fairtrade offers miners fair prices in addition to the Fairtrade 
Premium. The Fairtrade Ecological Premium is granted on top of other payments for mining 
operations that have eliminated the use of mercury and cyanide. 
         A shift in public opinion spurred the creation of Fairtrade gold standards after several 
incidents drew consumer attention to the impacts of gold mining in the developing world, driving 
demand for ethically sourced gold. Large-scale mining drew negative attention from its 
environmental disruption and hazardous pollution. NGOs then launched campaigns exposing 
social and environmental problems associated with small-scale mining, and the public became 
aware of gold mining used to fund conflict in the Congo.145 It also became “trendy” to consume 
fairly traded or ethically sourced products.146 Several initiatives targeted the large-scale mining 
industry, but few addressed the needs of small-scale mining communities. With over 16 million 
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small miners globally and an estimated 500,000 in Peru, the Fairtrade Organization has begun to 
make steps to ensure minimal environmental impacts while generating maximum social and 
economic benefits to miners and their communities. 
         To achieve Fairtrade Certification miners must comply with strict standards to ensure 
human and environmental protection.147 These include general requirements like paying taxes, 
fees, and royalties to relevant authorities, securing accreditation from necessary government 
agencies or NGOs of the “artisanal and small-scale nature” of mining enterprises, and adopting 
anti-corruption policies forbidding bribery, money laundering, illegal taxation, and extortion. 
Fairtrade also sets trade, production, and business development requirements. The trade 
standards outline rules that companies and/or organizations need to comply with to sell 
Fairtrade-certified gold or other precious metals. Traceability is one of the key aims of these 
standards to ensure that the ethical mining of metals can be verified. The production standards 
require that mining operations define their System of Production to register all participating 
miners, areas of operation, processing units, external service providers, and a mining plan with 
concession numbers. Both miners and traders are expected to have Internal Control Systems 
(ICS). On the miner side, the ICS is supposed to cover all volume and sales into the Fairtrade 
supply chain to ensure the exclusion of precious metals or tailings from non-registered miners, 
areas, or other processing units. Small-scale mines are also supposed to have regular monitoring 
of operating areas by authorized persons like a shift manager. Processing facilities are supposed 
to comply with ICS by listing all miners and processing units that deliver gold, minerals, and 
tailings to them with a signature and ID number of the responsible person. These facilities should 
record delivery dates, amounts, areas of origin, gold content, and payment of Fairtrade Minimum 
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Price and Premium to miners. The production standards also have measures for environmental 
and ecosystem protection to support practices that minimize environmental contamination, 
restore ecosystems fully, and avoid invasion of protected areas. Fairtrade does not expect small-
scale miners to immediately eliminate gold production using toxic substances for certification. 
Mercury is cheap, easy to use, and accessible for miners, while rolling out new production 
technologies is financially burdensome and requires special technical knowledge. Therefore, 
Fairtrade will still pay miners their premium while they are in the process of converting to more 
sustainable mining methods. 
         The financial burdens on miners to meet Fairtrade requirements are significant, so to 
compensate miners for their efforts to abide by ethical operating procedures, Fairtrade offers 
miners a Fairtrade Minimum Price for their gold as well as a Fairtrade Premium. The Fairtrade 
Minimum Price is set at 95% of the market price of gold. This market price is set twice a day by 
the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA). Miners also receive a Fairtrade Premium of 
$2000 per kilogram of high-quality gold. Miners can also earn a Fairtrade Ecological Premium, 
an extra 15% on top of the guaranteed minimum price, if gold is produced without the use of 
chemicals like mercury or cyanide.148 
            The weak governance and well-known corruption in remote areas of Madre de Dios make 
certification schemes difficult to effectively implement and verify to avoid unethical or illegal 
gold from infiltrating the supply chain. However, once mining rights are secured and operating 
processes meet certain legal, ethical, and sustainability standards, new blockchain-based 
technology can be used as a tool to register and record the transfer of ethical gold from the 
source to the end-product (See B.). 
 

















Figure 19. Gold certification program evaluation.  
B. PRIVATE SECTOR SOLUTIONS: BLOCKCHAIN-ENABLED SUPPLY MANAGEMENT 
Blockchain is the technology behind Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, and it functions 
as a shared set of information across a decentralized global network of computers that is 
continuously updated as new transactions occur. The database is not stored at a central location 
but simultaneously across millions of computers with internet access, making transactions 
transparent, easily verifiable, and also nearly impossible to corrupt. Using this technology, a 
publicly distributed ledger could be created to secure the world’s ethical gold supply. It could 
support certification schemes like Fairtrade Gold to thwart illegally mined gold from entering the 
ethical gold supply chain at any stage. This is precisely what one corporate partnership aims to 
do. 
         In April 2018, Cobalt Blockchain (COBC) and DLT Labs announced a partnership to 
“provide secure, traceable and transparent methods for tracking and certifying the provenance of 
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metals and minerals through the entire supply chain from source to end-user.”149 DLT, which 
stands for Distributed Ledger Technology, has developed a supply chain and logistics product 
called DL Asset Track to help complex supply chain networks maintain end-to-end visibility 
between producers, distributors, and final consumers.150 The partnership is seeking to adapt this 
tool to create a distributed ledger platform specifically for entities involved in metals and 
minerals trading. With the increased global awareness of deplorable working conditions for 
miners, the global consumer demand for ethical and conflict-free mining products has soared, 
and with it, the need for transparent and reliable methods of tracking origins. COBC recently 
acquired cobalt mining concessions in the Democratic Republic of Congo in an area with active 
small-scale miners. The platform will be piloted there before being offered commercially.  
         This distributed ledger platform works in the following way. The platform is created with 
regards to the industry and supply chain needs. Transactions are made user-to-user and verified 
through shared, secure records of the distributed ledger platform. When the asset finally reaches 
the end consumer, there exists a traceable, auditable, and incorruptible record of information for 
that asset. All transactions made throughout the network are updated constantly and are visible to 
authorized participants. Companies can track and record relevant information, especially origin 
and certification standards, without being able to alter them. Once a transaction is recorded, for 
example a newly mined oz of gold is bought from a certified miner, information about that 
transaction could not be altered for corrupt purposes down the line. Ease of tracing origins of 
mining products will help keep downstream buyers accountable for responsible gold sourcing. 
Higher demand incentivizes miners to achieve legal standards and certification requirements so 
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that their output can earn higher market prices. It remains unclear how COBC/DLT plans to 
certify mined cobalt. They will likely have to partner with local governments or international 
certification processes to integrate them into their platform. In the case of the gold supply chain, 
it is also unclear as to how a blockchain-based supply management platform would account for 
recycled or grandfathered gold sources, if at all. A problem also arises when one entity buys a 
physical asset but sells it in a conventional way (i.e. a cash transaction) because the ownership 
verification would occur on two different databases that do not communicate.151 
            In Peru, the government can support blockchain-based transactions by clarifying the legal 
framework in which small-scale gold miners operate. This would include improving 
formalization procedures and monitoring and regulating mining concessions so that miners are 
able to operate within the formal economy and therefore eligible for certification. They would 
also need to expand basic infrastructure requirements like reliable energy sources and internet 
connection to remote areas where mining occurs.152 Formal and certified miners would then be 
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Figure 20. Evaluation of Fairtrade certification aided by a blockchain-based gold supply 
management platform. 
C. CENTRALIZED GOLD BUYING PROGRAMS: LEARNING FROM CHILE’S ENAMI 
 In the 1940s, the Peruvian government created the Banco Minero (Mining Bank) to 
provide financing and loans to small-scale miners, but the government suspended its operations 
on December 18, 1990 after the bank had over $70 million in outstanding “bad” loans and an 
additional $4 million debt for operating expenses.153 The bank was unsustainable because of 
mismanagement and the failure of many small mines at the time. From 1980 to the bank’s 
closure, the number of employees grew from less than 200 to around 1,600, while only 5 of the 
1,000 loans had been made to small-scale mines still in operation.154 In the late 1960s there were 
around 450 small-scale miners in Peru, but in 1990 when the Banco Minero closed, only 10 
small-scale mines remained in operation after either being nationalized or going bankrupt. The 
government considered reopening the Banco Minero, but ultimately president Alberto Fujimori 
decided not to because of the losses it had amassed. 
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 Not only did the Banco Minero provide financing for small-scale miners, which in 
today’s context would be useful in efforts to aid the transition to safer, mercury-free technology 
in small-scale mining, but it also ran a centralized gold-buying program that would purchase the 
entire production of small-scale gold miners in Peru, cutting out the middlemen. While in the late 
20th century, a mining development bank proved unsustainable, today with over 500,000 small-
scale miners in Peru, forming a development bank for miners would not only be feasible but 
would also provide an avenue to foster a close government-SSM community relationship that 
could be leveraged to encourage formalization and the adoption of clean technologies while also 
providing miners with direct market prices for their gold production. 
        Peru’s mining bank could mirror Chile’s ENAMI. As the world’s largest copper producer, 
Chile has turned to a centralized organizational body to exert some level of regulation over its 
small- to medium-scale copper mining industry for the miners’ benefit, and a similar concept 
could greatly benefit ASGM in Peru. Founded in 2000, the Empresa Nacional de Minería 
(ENAMI) was created with the purpose of promoting the development of small- and medium-
scale mining firms in Chile.  
         ENAMI is a government-owned entity, but it is structured like a business. Its large scale 
buying and selling operations generate enough revenue for financial self-sufficiency and provide 
general support and oversight to this industry sector. ENAMI’s manages public policies for the 
promotion and development of small- and medium-scale mining, introducing an ethical code as 
well as policies for sustainability, environmental protection, occupational health and safety, 
energy efficiency, process quality, and mining support help to achieve its mission. An auditory 
committee acts as an internal control mechanism to ensure policy compliance in various 
processes and efficient resource consumption. The quantity of copper ore that ENAMI is able to 
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buy, process, and sell gives it leverage to negotiate higher prices on the international market. In 
turn, miners receive competitive prices for their ore rather than selling their output to swindling 
middlemen.155 
         ENAMI’s sustainability and environmental policies help protect workers by enacting risk 
management strategies and supporting a culture of prevention at their processing units. They 
ensure that ENAMI processing plants efficiently consume water and energy resources while also 
minimizing environmental contamination from air pollution or toxic residues. Miners can also 
receive technical and financial assistance to help improve their mining processes and increase 
production outputs. Access to new, more sustainable mining technology is crucial for supporting 
best practices in the sector.  
          In the context of small-scale mining in Peru, formalized miners would benefit from a 
similar organizational structure to that of ENAMI. A central buying and selling scheme for gold 
produced would reduce the vulnerability of small miners in remote areas to corrupt or criminal 
gold buyers who are obstacles for fair compensation. Centralizing the transactions between 
miners and gold buyers would undercut abusive middlemen and would have the added benefits 
of collective price negotiation on the international market as well as the possibility of 
administering technical and financial assistance to miners.156 Access to these resources would 
also make ethical gold certification schemes more accessible to miners (See Prospective 
Solutions A).  
 Former Peruvian president Pedro Pablo Kuczynski recently proposed creating a 
development bank entity to connect miners with financial assistance, but his ultimate removal 
 
155 “Reporte de Sustentabilidad 2017,” accessed April 22, 2018, 
https://www.enami.cl/api/descarga?f=/Reporte%20Sustentabilidad/ReporteSust2017-ENAMI-
bfinal.pdf&f=/Reporte%20Sustentabilidad/ReporteSust2017-ENAMI-bfinal.pdf. 
156 Korinek, “Managing the Minerals Sector.” 
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from the presidency prevented this idea from gaining any traction;157 However, the solution is 
still promising because of the technical and financial support it can provide miners. A 
development bank for small-scale miners with a centralized gold buying program would face 
political resistance despite the potential benefits it could bring. By starting a mining bank, some 
would perceive the government as encouraging illegal gold mining activity and condoning all of 
the negative public health and environmental costs associated with ASGM. A development bank 
specifically for miners could prop up government institutions in the region and encourage 
formalization, as some sort of registration would be required to access loans and another bank 
resources. It could also support alternative economic development by reinvesting revenue from 
gold buying into sustainable small-scale enterprises in Madre de Dios. A new Banco Minero is 
an interesting proposition, but it would require a lot of collaboration and coordination between 
















Figure 21. Mining development bank with a centralized gold buying program.  
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Figure 20. Final report card. 
Our analysis applies a management consulting problem-solving approach combined with 
policy analysis to evaluate current and prospective strategies and how efficiently they address the 
root causes of illegal gold mining in Peru. Supply-side and demand-side factors as well as 
institutional weaknesses all contribute to the proliferation of illegal mining in Madre de Dios.  
 102 
 From a supply standpoint, miners want to engage in ASGM because of the promise of 
lucrative profits and the lack of alternative economic opportunities. From the demand-side, high 
demand for gold exists from consumers and criminal organizations that create conflicting 
interests in mining practices. Consumers want sustainably sourced gold while criminal 
organizations have no interest in where their gold comes from, just that it can be successfully 
used to launder profits from drug sales in the U.S. and elsewhere. Institutional weaknesses in 
Madre de Dios impedes the government’s ability to support formalization efforts and makes 
enforcement of labor and environmental standards more difficult. 
Through our problem-solving process, we discovered that the current strategies used by 
the government could be strengthened with a blockchain-aided gold certification scheme and the 
founding of a development bank for mining.  
Operation Mercury 2019 is the main avenue through which the Peruvian government 
aims to address the issues caused by illegal mining in Madre de Dios. Its three-pronged strategy 
approaches gold mining from multiple dimensions through military raids, investment in 
formalization, and developing sustainable alternative economic opportunities in the region. 
While the military raids were overall costly and only provided a short-term reduction in illegal 
mining activity, the planned military bases could be an effective avenue for establishing 
government authority in the region. Formalization rates continue to lag, but the potential tax 
revenue from newly formalized miners could provide significant capital for infrastructure and 
sustainable development projects. Long-term sustainable development initiatives through 
Operation Mercury are in their early stages, but if the government efficiently invests available 
funds, they could generate a significant number of jobs in sustainable industries like aquaculture 
that earn comparable annual incomes to small-scale gold mining.  
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In addition to investment in these areas, the government is trying to reduce mercury use 
in ASGM through education programs like planetGOLD that teach about the health risks of 
mercury. By discouraging its use and providing technical and capital assistance to miners, the 
hope is that miners will choose to invest in safer, mercury-free technology. The project set a 
conservative goal of reducing 15 tonnes of mercury from use across Peru when the country as a 
whole emits 145 tonnes of mercury per year. 
Each “prong” of Operation Mercury and efforts to curb mercury use can be improved 
upon through complementary solutions that we explored in Chapter 5. The Peruvian government 
can address gold demand-side factors by supporting Fairtrade gold initiatives. The demand for 
eco-conscious gold is growing among consumers and adopting ethical and responsible mining 
practices would allow ASGM to earn higher revenues for their gold. A blockchain-based 
management platform would add additional traceability and security in an ethical gold supply 
chain, preventing illegally mined gold from infiltrating it. Finally, the installation of a new 
Banco Minero could assist the government with effective investment planning for sustainable 
development projects, and any additional revenue from a centralized gold-buying program could 
be reinvested in these sustainable initiatives. A mining bank could also strengthen formalization 
efforts by helping to foster formal business relationships with miners.   
As the buying and selling of illegally mined gold become more difficult and the buying 
and selling of ethically produced gold become more lucrative, gold miners will slowly transition 
to responsible production processes. In the meantime, the Peruvian government faces a valuable 
opportunity to facilitate a quicker transition to sustainable mining practices through its current 
efforts aided by new complementary strategies.  
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